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The legacy of apartheid in the social and economic fabric of South Africa is pervasive. 
More than two million households, with an average of five persons per household, are 
living in shacks or in hostels. Thus, the South African Government of National Unity as its 
most urgent priority has endeavoured to find solutions to this disastrous housing crisis. 
Thus, the Government proposed--amongst other measures--to establish a Government-
supported Mortgage Indemnity Scheme. 
However, such loan-guarantees are not cost free. Moreover, since they are contingent 
liabilities, the contingency of which may be realised and thus impose a cost to the 
Government, it is important that such cost be known or estimated. Using the modified 
Merton's model of an analytic derivation of the cost of loan guarantees, this paper 
evaluates the potential cost that may be imposed to the Government. 
While the paper recognised that there may be scope for some kind of the Government loan 
guarantees, the overriding theme is that the Government should charge a fee for its loan 
guarantee. Moreover, it has also been illustrated that the main beneficiaries of the MIS will 
be: (a) households at the upper end of the low-cost housing market, and (b) private 
financial institutions which will be indemnified by the terms of MIS . Accordingly, the mere 
fact that the main beneficiaries will be those two categories of end-users and not these at 
the lower segment of the low-cost housing market 1 suggests that the MIS may not attain 
its principal purpose--that of serving these in the lowest income group. Thus, there is no 
reason why the Government should bear the likely cost of the MIS . In contrast, the 
Government should charge a fee for its guarantee. 
1Based on the fact that the households at the upper-end of low-cost housing market could presumably 
afford home loan and that private financial institutions would enter this segment of the market regardless 
of the government loan guarantee. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The legacy of apartheid in the social and economic fabric of South Africa is pervasive. 
Half of the South African population is illiterate; thirty-five percent of the economically 
active population is unemployed; more than two million households, with an average of 
five persons per household, are living in shacks or in hostels. Moreover, the mere fact that 
almost half of these households earn less than R800 per month gives them very little 
hope--in short or medium terms--of acquiring even a modest home. At the same time, to 
those households which are earning more than R800 and which can afford to buy or build 
a house, access to the home-loan market has been largely foreclosed. Thus, in spite of 
democratisation of the country, at the present, there are still two major categories of the 
South African citizens: the first category are those citizens who have access to the home 
loan market and are reasonably able to obtain a residential dwelling; and second, which 
consists of almost sixty percent of the total South African population, and which can be 
sub-divided into further two classes; the first of which can afford to borrow and to obtain 
housing units on their own but to whom access to the home loan market is denied, and the 
second class which under the present conditions--earning less than R800 per month, high 
interest rates--can not afford to buy houses or obtain home loans. 
There are several reasons why access to the home loan market was denied to the majority 
of the South African population. Before the l 980's, the most important factor was 
apartheid itself with its racially-based laws which banned the non-white population from 
owning land in "white areas" and residential units in the territory of South Africa, and--
while after l 980's--the bond repayment default and the ever-increasing political violence 
which led financial institutions to completely abandon the lower end of the housing 
market. Thus, in the last years of apartheid, the housing "backlog", and in particular the 
housing "backlog" amongst the non-white population, has become even worse. 
The South African Government of National Unity, elected in the first democratic elections 
of April 1994, as its most urgent priority has endeavoured to find solutions to this 
disastrous housing crisis. However, the Government was also aware of the limited 
resources that could be devoted to solve the housing crisis. The Government, faced with 
the State's limited resources and an unwillingness of the major private financial 
institutions to re-enter the low-cost housing market, proposed--amongst other measures--
to establish a Government-supported Mortgage Indemnity Scheme. The purpose of this 
scheme is to induce the major financial institutions to serve the lower end of the home loan 
I 
market and to make it possible for 'qualified' low-income households to borrow money to 
build houses. 
However, such loan-guarantees are not cost-free. Moreover, since they are contingent 
liabilities, the contingency of which may be realised and thus impose a cost to the 
Government, it is important that such cost be known or estimated. The problem is that in 
establishing the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, the South African Government neglected to 
quantify the cost of its loan guarantee, i.e. the cost of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, 
which cost may be substantial. Thus, the first goal of the paper is to evaluate the real cost 
of the Government loan guarantees, i.e. the cost of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme. 
Another unanswered question is whether the South African Government, and ultimately 
the South African tax-payers, should bear all likely cost of such loan guarantees. Under 
the proposed present structure of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, the only actor who 
will bear the likely cost is the South African Government. This paper will attempt to 
demonstrate that the end-users of the Government loan guarantees--private financial 
institutions and home loan borrowers those who will ultimately benefit most of the 
government loan guarantees--should bear the major part of the likely cost of the Mortgage 
Indemnity Scheme, if not its entirety. Thus, the paper will attempt to present the case that 
the Government should charge a fee for its loan guarantee programme. 
The paper is structured as follows : Chapter One reviews the general theory of the 
consequences of the government loan guarantees and presents four different models for 
evaluating the cost of such guarantees. The Second chapter gives an overview of the 
current situation in housing in South Africa. Chapter Three presents a housing model 
which will be used to evaluate the real cost of the proposed Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, 
while the various results obtained by this model will be presented and analysed in Chapter 
Four. Finally, the Conclusion presents the summary of the main findings of the paper. 
2 
CHAPTERl 
GOVERNMENT LOAN GUARANTEE 
PROGRAMMES 
1.1. The Consequences of Loan Guarantees Programmes 
Almost all Governments are involved, in one way or another way, in the process of credit 
allocation. According to Kane, 1 credit allocation involves a number of different techniques 
that are intentionally employed by the Government to influence lenders to discriminate 
(negatively or positively) against some groups of would-be borrowers in economically 
arbitrary, but politically preferred, ways. The explanations usually applied to justify such 
Government interventions are based on: (a) unintentional discriminatory consequences of 
macro-economic aggregate policies;2 (b) alleged "market failures" due to the unique 
nature of credit markets and, in particular, of information friction in credit markets. 3 The 
aim of such Government interventions is to neutralize the negative effects of aggregate 
policies and/or market failure thus "improving one or more dimensions of national 
economic performance" . 4 
Two major forms of Government intervention in credit markets are direct loans and loan 
guarantees. In the case of direct loans, the loans are dispensed by a Government agency 
which acts as an intermediary between the Government and the final recipients (i.e., 
targeted borrowers) of the loans instead of through private financial institutions, e.g. 
banks. The Government agencies raise the necessary funds on the financial markets by 
issuing Treasury securities so that the interest cost to the ultimate borrowers will be lower 
than that on the funds raised by banks or individuals because of the greater 
creditworthiness of the Government. If it is assumed that Government agencies pass this 
reduction in the interest rate on to borrowers, then the targeted borrowers will be able to 
obtain loans at lower rates of interest. 
In the case of Government loan guarantees, the Government-targeted borrowers will 
obtain their loans through the banking system in the same way as do other borrowers. The 
difference is that loans granted to the designated borrowers are fully guaranteed by the 
1Kane, E . "Good intentions and unintended evil: The case against selective credit allocation", Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking , (1977, vol. 9, pp. 50-69). 
2The most obvious example is housing, where an increase of the rate of interest will have a negative effect 
on the low-income household's ability to purchase a house due to a higher rate of payment. 
3Williamson gives the case of credit rationing as an example of the special nature of credit markets. Credit 
rationing exist when some of would-be borrowers are denied credits even though they are prepared to pay 
the market interest rate (or even higher) while there are some similar borrowers who do obtain the credit. 
Williamson, S. "Do informational friction justify federal credit programs", Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, (1994, vol. 26, pp. 523-544) 
4Kane, E. op.cit. pp. 51 
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Government against payment default. In such circumstances, and within the framework of 
the competitive banking environment, banks will presumably pass the economic value of 
the guarantee on to the borrowers. Thus banks will charge a lower interest rate on such 
loans than on loans without the Government guarantees. 
To assess the overall effects of Government intervention on credit markets, two models of 
Government loans guarantees are presented: the first model is Fried's general model of 
portfolio choice, 5 and the second is Williamson's model of informational friction in credit 
markets. 
1.1.1. Fried's General Model of Portfolio Choice 
In his assessment of the consequences of: (a) Government loan guarantees, and 
(b) Government direct loans programmes, on the rate of interest and aggregate demand, 
Fried employs "a general model of portfolio choice". According to Fried, the principal 
difference between the two programmes lies in a choice of the portfolios that banks and 
households will hold. The basic idea is that for any change in the amount of Government 
direct loans granted there is a change in "the amount of Government securities that must 
be held either by banks or households" .6 The model is a two-period one: (a) Period 0--
without any Government programmes; and (b) Period 1--with the Government-guaranteed 
loans programmes. 
The loan market in Period O is presented in Figure 1-1 , below. The demand for loans by 
the private sector is conventionally downward sloping (=D0) , and is a function of three 
variables: (1) the interest rate (=Re); (2) rates of return on capital goods; and (3) rates of 
return on Government securities. Due to the increasing marginal cost of lending, the credit 
supply curve (=S0) is upward sloping. It is a function of the rate of return on assets that 
banks can hold. The supply curve will shift up and inwards for an increase in the rate of 
return on these assets. The intersection of demand and supply curves at point E0 depicts a 
loan market equilibrium. The point L0 depicts the equilibrium level of loans, while Re0 
depicts the equilibrium level of the loan rate of interest. 
5Fried, J. "Government loan and guaranty programs", Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
(December 1983, pp. 22-31). In his article, Fried evaluates the consequences of both government direct 
loans and government loan guarantees on interest rate and aggregate demand. Throughout this paper the 
implications of government direct loans programs are ignored. 






Source: Fried, (1983), pp. 25 
Credit 
FIGURE 1-1 
The Loan Market, Excluding Government Loans Programmes 
With the introduction of a Government-guaranteed loans programmes at the beginning of 
Period 1 the following two assumptions complete the model: 
(a) Government will provide designated borrowers with a fixed subsidy rate (=Rg); and 
(b) In a competitive banking environment, at the margin, the profits rate on guaranteed 
loans (=Rg) and on non-guaranteed loans (=Re) are equalised, or 
(1.1) 
This is shown in Figure 1-2, below, which presents the loan market with the Government-
guaranteed loans programmes. This period can be divided into three stages. In the first 
stage, with the introduction of the loan guarantees, the total demand for loans will increase 
for a given interest rate Reo . The line Dlt presents the new total demand, while D1 
describes all potential borrowers who are not eligible for the guaranteed loans. At this 
stage, there is an excess demand for the loans given by L2 - L0. 7 Thus, excess demand will 
force the loan rate of interest Reo to rise to a new level given by R· . The new-quasi 
equilibrium (=E') is given by the intersection between S0 and D1t at the point L' which 
depicts the quasi-equilibrium level ofloans. 
7Due to the introduction of loans guarantees, the total demand will become less inelastic, while demand 






Source: Fried, (1983), pp. 26 
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FIGURE 1-2 
The Loan Market, Including Government Guaranteed Loans 
Secondly, a higher rate of interest ( =R') will induce banks to raise additional funds to 
satisfy the higher demand for loans. Thus, banks will sell Government securities causing 
their price to fall, and thus increase the rate of return on these securities, which will shift 
the supply curve up. s 
In the capital goods market, the additional supply of loans ( =L'-L0) leads to an increase in 
demand for 'titles to capital goods' and pushes up the price of capital goods. However, a 
combination of a rise in price and a rise in interest rate leads to a decline in the rate of 
return on capital goods (=RJ. This decline in Rk causes the total demand for loans to 
decline but the amplitude of decline is assumed by Fried to be insufficient to shift the 
demand curve to its initial level at L0. 9 Thus, at the end of this stage, the new equilibrium 
will be at the intersection of the new supply curve (=S1) and the new total demand curve 
(=D1J. The total supply of loans will be equal to an amount L4, consisting of L3 non-
guaranteed loans and L4-L3 Government-guaranteed loans. The new level of loans, L4, is 
lower than L2 but it is still greater than L0. The equilibrium interest rate is Re1 and the rate 
of interest on Government-guaranteed loans, Rg = Re1 - Rs, will be less than Reo. 
In the third stage, as a result of a movement in the loan market, and, in particular, of an 
8 As mentioned above, the supply curve will shift up and inwards for an increase in the rate of return on 
assets that banks can hold. 
9The demand of loans for capital goods is only a part of the total demand of loans. 
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increase in the pnce of capital goods, 10 there is an increase in aggregate demand in 
general. Fried assumes that an increase in aggregate demand will lead to a rise in real 
income initialy, and only after some time will it cause an increase in the price level. Thus, 
at the beginning of this stage, there is an increase in savings ( as a result of an increase in 
the rate of interest), and an increase in investments. Over time, the price level will begin to 
rise, causing a decline in the real balances that are held by banks and households. At the 
end of this stage, banks, in an attempt to preserve the real value of their assets, will 
decrease the supply of the loans, thus forcing interest rates to increase again. 
The overall result is, in the words of Fried, that "the distribution of loans would be such 
that recipients of Government-guaranteed loans would have a greater command over 
resources at the expense of borrowers ineligible for guarantees and the population at large 
who pays for the subsidies in the programmes" _ 11 
1.1.2. Williamson's Model of a Credit With Costly State Verification 
To evaluate the effects of Government loan guarantees on credit markets, Williamson uses 
"the costly state verification model" .12 The model is a two-period, partial equilibrium 
model of credit markets. The only agents (=i) in the credit market are lenders (=a) and 
entrepreneurs (=1-a). The agents (=i) are uniformly distributed over the interval [O, l] , 
where 1/ 2 < a < 1. 
In period 1, each lender has one unit of time. They have two choices regarding their use of 
the unit of time: (a) to consume it as leisure; or (b) to produce one unit of an investment 
good (i.e. savings) and to lend it to entrepreneurs. In the case of (b) consumption is 
postponed until period 2. Consumption in period 2 will depend on the expected return 
from investment in period 1, which is at least equal to the credit market expected return 
(=r) . 
In period 1, each entrepreneur can use one unit of savings to obtain technology that will 
yield return x in period 2. Thus, each entrepreneur will use return x to repay his debt in 
period 2. If xis less than the rate of promised payment (=R) , the entrepreneur is in a state 
of bankruptcy. The value of the rate of promised payment is equal to zero and the lender 
10The rise in the price of capital goods will stimulate the production of them, thus shifting the aggregate 
supply curve to the right. 
Ilfried, J. , op. cit. pp. 27 
12 Williamson, S., op. cit. 
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will incur a loss. On the assumption that x is known only to the entrepreneur, any lender 
who wants to verify that the entrepreneur is reporting a true x will incur a fixed 
verification cost (=y) in the process of evaluating x. Thus, a financial debt contract is 
required to ensure that borrowers report correctly about their real returns while 
minimising the lender's verification cost. 13 
The expected return to the lender can be expressed as: 
R 
r = nl(R, y) = f (x -y) dF(x) + R [l - F(R)], (1.2) 
0 
where F( ... ) is the probability distribution function, with the corresponding probability 
density function/( ... ). Simplifying, using partial integration, equation (1.2) can be 
expressed as 
R 
nt(R, y) = R - f F(x)dx - yF(R) . (1.3) 
0 
For a constant y, under the restriction on F(x) such that 
1t~1 (R, y) = -f (R) - y f'(R) > 0, (1.4) 
the expected return to the lender 1s a concave function of R. The condition m 
equation ( 1. 4) implies that there will be a sole maximum of expected return to 
entrepreneurs for some R* and a constant y, with R = R* . 
At equilibrium, the model may display two solutions: (a) if the quantity of the available 
loans at equilibrium is q, and q is equal to 1-a, then, all entrepreneurs will receive loans 
and rationing does not exist; 14 (b) in the case when q is less then 1-a, in spite of the fact 
that all entrepreneurs are identical, some of them may be rationed out of the credit market 
while others very similar to them may receive the loans. In this case, the 'rationed' 
entrepreneurs are worse off than these entrepreneurs who received loans. 15 And, this is the 
case that Government loan guarantees programmes attempt to correct. 
13In spite of the existence of a financial debt contract the entrepreneur may always report that x ~ 0 which 
imply that R = 0. Therefore, lenders need to verify that entrepreneurs report a real value of x. 
14A highly unrealistic assumption. 
15The problem is that the rationed entrepreneurs can not offer a better debt contract to the lenders than 
existing ones. If they do, it will lead to higher interest rates, thus increasing the probability of bankruptcy, 
which in turn will increase the verification cost incurred by lenders, and ultimately that will lead to lower 
9 
On the assumptions that: 
(1) the Government guarantees are a fixed fraction of the promised payment on a loan 
to the lenders given by vR, where O<v<l , and R is the value of the promised 
payment; 
(2) lenders need to pay a fixed insurance premium given by P; 
(3) verification of the entrepreneur's return is publicly observable; 
(4) the Government will not pay anything to the lender unless : (a) the borrower 
defaults on the promised payment; (b) the lender has verified the entrepreneur's 
return at some place in the world; (c) x < vR, 
the expected return to the lender can be written as 
vR R 
nl(R, y) = J (vR- y)dF(x) + J (x - y)dF(x) + R [l -F(R)] -P. (1.5) 
vR 
Simplifying, using partial integration, equation ( 1. 5) can be expressed as 
R 
nl(R, y) = R - f F(x)d(x) - yF(R) - P + R [l - F(R)]. (1.6) 
vR 
With the insurance premmm, P, set by the Government in such a way that the 
Government-guaranteed loan programme becomes self-financing, P can be expressed as 
vR 
P = J (vR - y)dF(x) . (1.7) 
Substituting, the expected return 
n~ (R, y, v) = 1 -F(R) + vF(vR) - yf(R), (1.8) 
so that 
n~/R, y, v) = F(vR) + v2/(vR) > 0. (1.9) 
returns to the lenders. 
10 
Substituting for P (given by equation (1.7)) in equation (1.6) and differentiating with 
respect to the interest rate the result will be that the equilibrium rate of interest will be the 
same both without the Government loan guarantees programmes (P=v=O) and with no 
rationing ( q= 1-a) and with the Government loan guarantees programmes on the credit 
market (P given by equation (1.6) and v>O), i.e. there will be no change in the interest 
rate due to the introduction of Government loan guarantees programmes. 
This result is due to the fact that the equilibrium expected rate of return to the lenders is 
less than the maximum rate of returns (=R <R*), since the expected rate of return with the 
loan guarantee is i</R, y, v)>O. Figure 1-3, below, presents the situation with no 













Effect of Loan Guarantee on the Lender's Expected Return Function 
The equilibrium loan payment, (=R..), and the equilibrium risk-free market return, (=f ), is 
given by the intersection of the guarantee and non-guarantee curve. 
In the situation where there is credit rationing equilibrium (a more realistic situation) and 
in the absence of the Government loan guarantees, there will be an initial equilibrium 
risk-free rate of return and loan payment given by r 1 and R1 respectively. When the 
Government loan guarantees are introduced, there is a shift in the equilibrium rate of 
return and in the loan payment. The new equilibrium rates are given by r2 and R2 
respectively. Figure 1.4, below, presents the equilibrium risk-free market return, (r1 and r2) 
and the equilibrium loan payment (R1 and R2 ) with and without loan guarantees on the 
11 
credit market. 
Because the loan guarantee programme is self-financing, the new equilibrium rate must be 
at the point of intersection between "the perceived expected return function for the lender 
with a loan guarantee" and "the expected return function with no guarantee" .16 Thus, r 2 
has to be less than or equal to r l' which will lead to credit rationing. Since 7t ~3 (R, y, v) > 0 
then ~ is greater than R1 and r2 is less than r 1• In this case, the consequences of the 
Government loan guarantees programmes are contradictory. All participants in the credit 
markets are 'worse off with the introduction of loan guarantees. The lenders are 
confronted by a lower market rate of return thus causing the supply of the loans to be 
lower. Moreover, due to the lower supply of the loans, borrowers face a higher interest 










Source: Williamson (1994), pp. 532 
FIGURE 1-4 
Promised payment 
Effect of Loan Guarantee on the Lender's Expected Return Function 
According to Williamson, the reason for the situation where "the Government loan 
guarantees have at best no effect, and at worse reduce welfare for everyone" 17 lies in the 
fact that, with the introduction of loan guarantees, the optimal financial debt contract 
between lenders and would-be borrowers is deformed. His recommendation is that to 
prevent these harmful effects of loan guarantees the Government needs to introduce a 
16Williamson, S., op. cit. pp. 532 
17Jbid. pp. 532 
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premium "that reflects the higher risk inherent in higher loan interest rates; thus, loan 
guarantees will become neutral and that is the optimal situation" .18 
1.2. The Cost of Loan Guarantees Programmes 
As has been shown by the above models, the costs of loan guarantees are implicit rather 
than explicit. The only explicit costs to the Government are the administrative costs of 
governing the programmes. 19 All other costs are implicit in their appearance. They are in 
the form of inefficient uses of productive resources and affect the whole population. The 
feature of the loan guarantees--to appear to be cheaper then they are in reality-- has a huge 
appeal to politicians, thus leading to various loan guarantees programmes. 
As mentioned above, under the loan guarantees programmes a Government guarantee to 
the lenders--usually at no charge--means that in the case of a borrower's default on his 
payment obligation, the Government will cover the value of the losses that lenders will 
incur in the process. That is similar to a Put option, where a Put option holder has a right, 
but not an obligation, to sell the underlying securities to the Put writer at a predetermined 
price. This feature of the loan guarantees--to behave as a put option--was first noted by 
Merton20 who showed that option-pricing theory can be applied to determine the value of 
a Government loan guarantee. In the case of the Government loan guarantees, the 
Government is actually acting as a Put option writer and banks are acting as an option Put 
holder, whereas the underlying stock is equal to a different types of real holdings pledged 
as a security against the loans. 
Subsequent to Merton's article, a number of models based, in one way or another, on the 
principles of option pricing theory, were developed to evaluate different types of loan 
guarantees. Therefore, it is useful to devote this section explaining very briefly the main 
characteristics of an option and the theoretical models of valuation of the option's "fair 
value" . 
1.2.1. Option Price Theory 
According to Figlewski and Silber, 21 a Call option is the right, but not the obligation to 
18Jbid. pp. 532 
190n the assumption of no default payments by the borrowers 
20Merton, C. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees; An application 
of modem pricing theory", Journal of Banking and Finance, (1977, vol. 1, pp 3-1). 
21Figlewski, S. , and Silber, W. "Options and options markets" , in Financial options: From theory to 
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buy a specified quantity of some underlying assets/securities on or before an expiration 
date. A Put option is the right, but not the obligation, to sell a specified quantity of some 
underlying assets for a specified exercise price on or before an expiration date. 
The main elements of an option contract are: 
( 1) A writer or a granter of an option and a buyer of the option. While a buyer has a 
right, but no obligation to undertake a specified transaction, a writer is under an 
obligation to perform a specified transaction chosen by the buyer. 
(2) The expiration date--which, in the case of an American option, is the time period 
within which a buyer has the right to exercise an option, and in the case of a 
European option, is the exact date when an option can be exercised. 
(3) The exercise price--a price at which the option buyer has the right to reqmre 
performance of a specified transaction, and, 
(4) Underlying assets/securities--the assets/securities on which an option is written. 
The holder of a Put option will exercise his right to sell the underlying assets to the writer 
of the Put only if the current value of the underlying assets is less than the option exercise 
price at the expiration date. If, at the expiration date, the current value of the underlying 
asset is higher than the exercise price, the option will expire unused. Thus, the upper and 
lower boundary value of the option, and the decision of the option holder, will depend on 
what happened to the value of the underlying assets. This can be expressed in 
mathematical form as: 
Put payoff at expiration= Max (X - S, 0), (1.10) 
where X represents the exercise price and S is the current value of the underlying assets. 
Thus, a Put option payoff to the option holder will be whatever is greater within the 
boundaries given by (X- S) or zero. 
On the other hand, the profit to the writer, from writing a Put option, would have an 
upper limit given by the Put option value, while his losses could be as high as the value of 
the exercise price, if the value of the underlying assets falls to zero. Figure 1-5, below, 
practice, ed. Figlewski, S., Silber, W., and Subrahmanyam, M. (New York University, 1990) 
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presents the profit and/or losses for a writer of a Put option. It can be seen from the 
illustration that in the case when the value of underlying assets falls from 100, the loss 
increases almost one unit for each unit of price, while on the opposite side, the profit is 
constant regardless of an increase in the value of the assets . 
From Figure 1-5, below, it can be seen that any losses incurred by the buyer of the Put 
option, due to the fall in the value of the underlying assets, will be covered by the Put 
option writer. In the case that the value of underlying securities is equal to the exercise 
prices and a Put option expired unused the maximum loss is equal to the initial investment 
in buying a put option. Thus, buying a Put option in combination with a long position in 
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The question arises as to how much an option buyer should pay for an option. Two most 
widely used theoretical valuation models for the purpose of calculating an option's fair 
value are the Black-Scholes and the Binomial option pricing models. Both models are 
based on the principle of arbitrage and on the option price relationship known as the 
"Put-Call parity" relationship. An arbitrage is a simultaneous buying at a lower price and 
selling the same thing, i.e. securities or portfolio of securities, at a higher price in order to 
obtain a riskless profit. In theory an arbitrage profit should not exist. A Put-Call parity is a 
relationship between the price of a Call and a Put option with the equal exercise price on 
one side, and on the other side, the current value of the underlying securities and the 
15 
present value of the option exercise price at the expiration date. In mathematical form the 
Put-Call parity can be expressed as: C-P=S-PV(X), where C and Pare the prices of a Call 
and a Put option respectively and PV(X) is present value discounted from the expiration 
date. 
1.2.1.1. The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model 
The model's five basic assumptions are as follows : 
(1) There exists a risky asset that can be bought and sold freely on the market at some 
current price S. The risky assets pays no dividends or other dispersal before the 
option's expiration date. There are no restrictions to short selling. 
( 2) The rate of interest at which one can lend or borrow without risk is fixed and 
interest accrues on a continuous basis at a rater. 
(3) The price of the underlying risky assets is continuous in time, and follows a 
random walk. The instantaneous mean and variance of the price change are 
proportional to the current price of the security, so that the mean and variance of 
the ( continuously compounded) rate of return per unit time both have constant 
values. This implies that the distribution of the security's current price over any 
period will be log normal. 22 
(4) There are no factors such as taxes, transaction costs, or margin requirements that 
can affect a rate of return on a risky assets. 
(5) The option can be exercised only at the time of expiration T, i.e. the option is a 
European option. 
Thus, the Black-Scholes option pricing model can be expressed in mathematical form as: 
C = SN [D] - X e-rT N [D - a..fi], (1.11) 
and 
P = X e-rTN [-D + a.ff] - S N[-D], (1.12) 
22The feature of the log normal distribution is that price can not be negative and that the size of the 











= a call option fair price, 
= a put option fair price, 
= the price of the underlying assets, 
= the exercise price, 
= time to option expiration, 
= the instantaneous riskless interest rate, 
ln(f )+(r+f )r 
a.ff 
= volatility of the underlying assets, 
N( ... )= the cumulative normal distribution function. 
Although assumption (5) states that the option under consideration is a European option, 
equations ( 1. 11) and ( 1. 12) can be also used to calculated the fair value of an American 
option.23 
1.2.1.2. The Binomial Model 
In additional to the Black-Scholes option pncmg model, yet another model for 
determination of 'correct' option value has been derived. This is the Binomial model. The 
model is based on the 'two price' approach, where the current price of an underlying assets 
(S) can move, over the relevant interval of time, only in two directions: (1) up to a value 
uS, or, (2) down to a value dS. 
Other assumptions are: 
(a) There is a one-period Put option on the assets, with an exercise price of X When the 
Put option expires in the next period, it pays the greater of the exercise prices minus the 
asset's value or 0. P denotes the price of the Put option; and 
(b) there is a riskless asset available that returns a total of R Rands in the next period for 
each one unit invested today. The gross interest rate R is one plus the interest rate, and it 
23The problem is that in the case of an American put option, the equation does not take into consideration 
whether it is economically optimal to exercise the option before the expiration date. In the case of an 
American call option, except in the case of payment of dividend, it is economically non-optimal to 
exercise an American option before expiration, in which case the value of the European and the American 
call option are equal. 
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is possible to lend or borrow freely at that rate. 
Figure 1-6, below, presents both possible assets prices and its corresponding put price 
respectively over one period. 
us Cu = Max [O, X - uS ] 
p 
s 
dS Cd = Max (0, X - dS ] 
FIGURE 1-6 
Possible Asset Prices and Corresponding Put Prices Over One Period 
Under principles of arbitrage, the cost of a portfolio that consists only of some quantity of 
an underlying assets plus riskless borrowing and lending and has an equal payoff as the 
option, should be equal to the cost of the option, otherwise, there is an arbitrage 
opportunity. Thus the mathematical expressions of a portfolio that consists of h units of 
the risky assets and B-amount of Rands invested in the riskless asset that is equal to the 
option value in both the up-state and the down-state are: 
Portfolio Payoff Option Value 
h x uS +RB X -uS (up-state), 
h x dS+RB 0 (down-state), 











Since, the portfolio of h units of assets plus B Rands of riskless borrowing costs is the 







Equation (1 .17) is the Binomial model's formula for the fair value of a one-period put 
option.24 
1.2.2. The Application of the Option Pricing Theory in the Models of 
Valuation of Loan Guarantees 
In general, two basic types of valuation models of loan guarantees have been developed: 
(1) continuous-time models and (2) discrete-time models. Continuous-time models are 
based on an assumption that investors are able to trade the underlying assets continuously 
in time and therefore to maintain a continuously hedged riskless portfolio. Since many 
loans and loan guarantees are not traded at all, and even if they were traded, would induce 
some very real cost, the assumption of continuous trading is rather too restrictive. 
Discrete-time models relax the assumption of continuous trading by restricting investors' 
preferences. Both types of models have their advantages and limitations, and pending on 
the particular application one type of model may be more appropriate than the other. 
Below, four different models are presented in some more details. 
1.2.2.1. Merton's Model of an Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Loan 
Guarantees 
As mentioned above, the first attempt to evaluate the cost of loan guarantees to a 
Government was that of Merton. His model is a continuous-time model, based essentially 
on the same assumptions as the Black-Scoles model (see section 1.2.1.1.) The model is 
constructed around a firm that--in order to raise funds--issues a discounted bond with the 
face value of B dollars at maturity date. Merton uses two scenarios in his model: 
(a) Scenario 1, in which the firm will be able to meet its payment obligation at the maturity 
date; and (b) Scenario 2, in which the firm will not be able to meet its payment obligations 
at maturity. 
At the maturity date in Scenario 1, the value of a firm's assets (=V) will be greater than its 
promised payment on the bond issues (=B) . Thus, it will be worthwhile for the 
24The formula for the call option is almost the same one. The only difference is that instead of (X - uS) in 
the above formula there is (uS - X). 
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management of the firm to repay the firm's debt even if that means selling the assets of the 
firm. The value of the firm's debt will be equal to B and the value of the firm's assets will 
be equal to V-B. In Scenario 2, the value of the firm's debt is greater than the value of the 
firm's assets. Thus, the value of debt will be equal to V and the value of the firm's assets 
will be equal to zero. In an abbreviated form the firm's debt can be expressed as Min[V, B] 
and the value of the asset as Max (0, V-B) . 
When a third-party guarantor (a Government) is introduced into the model the outcomes 
are slightly different. In scenario 1, the result will be the same as without Government 
involvement. The management will repay the firm's debt, equal to B, and the value of the 
firm's assets will be equal to (V-B). In Scenario 2, the bondholders will receive the value of 
the debt that is equal to B, the firm's assets will be equal to zero and the Government will 
incur a net payment or loss equal to (B-V), the difference between its payment to 
bondholders and the value of the firm's assets. 
Thus, at the date of expiration, in an abbreviated form, the value of the firm's assets is the 
same with or without the Government loan guarantee, or Max (0, V-B); the value of the 
debt is always B, which implies that the debt is riskless, while the value of the loan 
guarantee (G) is Max (0, B-V) . 





) - V<l>(x), (1.18) 
log(i)-(r + f )r 
- a.Jr 
cr2 is the variance rate per unit time of the logarithmic changes in the value of the 
assets. 
25This is the same as the modified equation from the Black-Scholes model, section 1.2.1.l. 
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On the assumption that Be-R(T)T is the market value of the debt without the loan guarantee 
and R(1) is the promised bond yield, then the market value of the debt with the loan 
guarantee will be Be-rT. Thus, 




1- e-<R(1) - r)T. (1.20) 
Equation (1 .20) gives the cost of the loan guarantees as the fraction of the firm's debt 
covered by the guarantee. 
1.2.2.2. Sosin's Model of the Valuation of Federal Loan Guarantees to 
Corporations 
Sosin's model26 estimates the value of loan guarantees in the presence of two types of 
debt, senior and junior debt. The model is based on the same general assumptions already 
mentioned under the Black-Scholes model (section 1.2.1.1.) with additional assumptions 
as follows : (a) throughout the existence of the firm, stockholders will receive constant 
proportional dividends ( =8); and (b) at the expiration date T, the bondholders will receive 
the full face value of the outstanding bond, while the stockholder will receive any residual 
moneys. 
The model is constructed around a firm that issued common stocks and bonds at time t = t
0
. 
The value of the bonds as a fraction of the firm's assets is given by 100(1-s)%, wheres 
(O~s~ 1) is the fraction of equity in the firm's capital structure. Thus, the aggregate market 
value of the firm, (=V(t0)) can be expressed as: V(t0)=S(t0)+B(t0). S(t0) is the market value 
of the firm's common stock, while B(t0) is the market value of the bonds, where 
B(t0)=(l-s)V(t0). 
At time T, the stockholders have a right to repurchase the face value of outstanding debt 
from the bondholders. Thus, the position of the stockholders (=S(t)) is equal to that of a 
holder of a European call option, with the face value of the outstanding debt equal to the 
26Sosin, B. "On the valuation of federal loan guarantees to corporations", The Journal of Finance, (1980, 
vol. 35, pp. 1209-1221). 
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exercise price X. Thus, if C(V(t0) , X, -c) denotes the value of the European call option at 
time t=t
0
, where -c is the term of the option (-c=T-t0) , then the exercise price can be 
determined implicitly from the following equation: 
(1.21) 
where the term ( 1-e-lh) V(t
0
) is the present value of the future proportional dividend stream. 
The value of a European call option that pays constant proportional dividends can be 
expressed as : 
(1.22) 
where 
d1 = [ln(V(t)IX + (r - 8+ cr2/2)-c]/crJr., and d2 = d1 - crlr. . 
In the second period, the firm undertakes an investment project where the costs of the 
project(=!) are greater then the project's market value cj, where~ (O ~ ~~ 1) is a present 
value profitability index of the project. 21 
The firm will finance the project with the subordinated Gunior) debt y, (O ~y~ 1) and with a 
fraction ( = 1-y) of equity. At time t = t0 , after the project has been financed, 
can be expressed as : 
(1 .23) 
where, under the assumption of the competitive market, D(t0)=yl and D(t0) denotes the 
initial market value of the junior debt. 28 
Because the firm is undertaking an investment project for which the market value is less 
then the investment costs, the firm will incur a loss at time T Due to assumption (b) the 
loss, (1-~)/, will be borne by pre-existing stockholders, while the inclusion of the junior 
debt will ensure that senior debt holders will be paid in full at time T. Thus, the value of 
the firm's bond before the project will not be influenced by the project, or BA (t0)=B(t0) . The 
market value of the firm's common stock after financing the project can be expressed as 
27Given the choice, a value maximising firm will invest only in projects where I;> 1 
28Subscript A denotes values after financing. 
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the call option to buy the firm at time T for the sum of the exercise prices of the junior 
(=X0 ) and senior (=XA) debt. 
In spite of its financial un-feasibility, on the assumption that the project is politically and 
socially beneficial, the Government would provide the firm with a loan guarantee for a 
fraction of the junior debt equal to a, (O~a~l), at zero cost. As in the case of the senior 
debt without loan guarantees, the value of the senior debt will be unaffected with the 
inclusion of loan guarantee in the model, thus, B0 (t0)=B(t0) . Subscript G denotes values 
under the loan guarantee. The value of the common stock will be 
(1.24) 
The firm's assets value under a loan guarantee will be: V0 (t0)=B(t0)+D(t0)+So(t0) . The 
theoretical value of the loan guarantee and the potential cost to a Government can be 
expressed as G( .. . )=V0 (t0)-VA(t0) . According to Sosin, this will be the cost to a 
Government if the Government were to buy the guarantee in a competitive market. 
At the end of his paper, Sosin presents his simulation results. The results suggest that the 
cost of loan guarantee moves in the same direction as the variance of the rate of return on 
the firm's assets. 
1.2.2.3. Jones and Masson's Model of Valuation of Loan Guarantees 
In their article, Jones and Mason29 evaluate four types of debt: (a) a fully guaranteed issue 
of non-callable coupon debt; (b) a partially guaranteed issue of non-callable coupon debt; 
( c) a junior and a senior issue of non-callable coupon debt with guarantees and ( d) a 
callable coupon debt with guarantees. They use contingent claim valuation models similar 
to that of Black-Scholes and Merton. Their assumptions are as follows: 
(1) There is continuous trading with no cost and no restriction on lending and 
borrowing at a risk-free interest rate. Short sales are allowed, and proceeds 
from such sale can be reinvested; 
(2) The risk-free interest rate, r, is known and is constant over time; 
(3) The price changes of the firm's common stock are continuous over time. 
29Jones, P. , Masson, S. "Valuation ofloan guarantees", Journal of Banking and Finance, (1980, vol. 34, 
pp 89-107) 
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( 4) The instantaneous variance of return, cr2, on the assets value, V, is constant 
over time; 
(5) Total cash payout, P, to all claimants depends at most on the asset value 
of the firm. 
The valuation of a contingent claim such as an non-guaranteed debt D(V, 't) or loan 
guarantee G(V, 't) is based on the partial differential equations given by Merton.30 The 
partial differential for an non-guaranteed debt D(V, 't) is 
1/2 a2V1Dw + (rV - P)Dv - D't - rD + p = 0, (1 .25) 
and the partial differential equation for a loan guarantee G(V, 't) is 
(1.26) 
where 't is time to maturity, P is the cash payout per unit time to the claim and subscripts 
w , v, and 't denotes partial differentiation. Thus, the valuation of the contingent claims 
given by the above equations depends only on observable variables--or if the variables are 
not observable--ones that can be easily estimated. 
To determine a unique solution of the contingent claims from equation (1 .25) and (1.26) 
respectively there is a need for terminal and boundary conditions. The terminal condition 
will determine the value of the contingent claims at maturity, 't=O, as a function of the 
firm's asset value. There are two boundary conditions: a lower boundary condition and an 
upper boundary condition. The lower boundary condition will determine the value of the 
contingent claim in the case of the firm defaulting on its coupon payment obligation before 
maturity date. The upper boundary condition will determine the value of the contingent 
claim in the case when the assets is growing in value, V~ oo. 
On the assumption that at the maturity date, 't=O, the asset value (=V) is equal to or 
greater then the face value of the bond (=B) or V>_B, the bondholders will receive a full 
amount of the bond's face value and D(V, O)=B. If the asset value is less then the face 
value of the firm's bond, V<B, then the debt can be worth only as much as the value of the 
firm's assets, or D(V, O)=V. Thus, the terminal condition of a fully guaranteed non-callable 
coupon debt is 
30Jbid. pp. 91 
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D(V, 0) = min (B, V) (1.27) 
which implies that at the maturity date, the debt will be worth the lesser of the face value 
of the bond or the firm's asset value. 
If, at maturity date, 't=O, the asset value (=V) is greater then the face value of the bond 
(=B) , V>B, the value of the guarantee is equal to zero. If the asset value is less then the 
face value of the bond, V<B, then the value of the guarantee is equal to the difference 
between two, G(V, 0) = B-V. Thus, the terminal condition of the guarantee is 
G(V, 0) = min (0, B-V), (1 .28) 
which implies that at the maturity date, the debt will be worth zero or the difference 
between the principal and the assets value, whichever is lower. 
Should the firm's asset value decrease to zero, V=O, at any time prior to maturity, the debt 
will also be worth zero. The lower boundary condition for a fully guaranteed non-callable 
coupon debt is 
D(O, 't) = 0 (1.29) 
Under the same circumstances, but with the additional assumption that a Government 
would undertake on principal payment, a lower boundary condition for the value of the 
guarantee will be 
G(O, 't) = B. (l .30a) 
In many loan guarantees programmes, a Government will undertake not only to repay the 
principal but also to repay the present value of coupons, discounted at the risk-free 
interest rate. Thus, if there is a promised coupon of c per unit time, the total liability of a 
Government will be equal to R('t), or R('t)=~(l-e-n)+Be-n. Thus, an alternative lower 
r 
boundary condition for the guarantee will be 
G(O, 't) = R('t) . (1.30b) 
In the case when the firm's assets value is growing, V ~ oo, an upper boundary condition of 
a fully guaranteed non-callable coupon debt is 
D(oo, 't) = R('t), (1.31) 
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which implies that the value of the debt will approach the value of a risk-free bond. The 
value of a guarantee will be equal to zero. 
G(oo, 1:) = 0. (1 .32) 
If a firm pays dividends ( =d) per unit time over the life of the non-callable coupon debt, 
with c representing promised payments, B the principal, and 't the number of time periods, 
the value of the non-guaranteed debt can be calculated from equation (1.25). Now, 
P=c+d, and p=c. The terminal condition is given by equation (1 .27). The lower and the 
upper boundary conditions are given by equation (1 .29) and (1 .31) respectively. 
The value of the guarantee31 can be calculated from equation (1.26) with P =c+d. The 
terminal condition is given by equation (1 .28). The lower boundary condition will be either 
equation (1.30a) or (1.30b) and the upper boundary condition are given by equation 
(1.32). 
In the case where the loan guarantee covers only a fraction ( =8) of the principal debt, 
equation (1.26) can be used to calculate the value of the partial guarantee. The terminal 
condition will be 
G(V, 0) = max (0, 8B - V), (1 .33) 
The lower boundary is given by 
G(O, -c) = 8B, (1 .34) 
while the upper boundary will be given by equation (1.32) . The value of the non-
guaranteed part of the debt can be calculated by equation (1 .25), with the terminal and 
boundary conditions given by equations (1.27), (1.29) and (1.31) respectively. 
The third case considered by Jones and Mason is that of a firm issuing two types of non-
callable coupon bonds, junior and senior. The junior bond pays coupons with value equal 
to c' per unit of time and with the bond's principal equal to B' . Similarly, the senior bond 
pays coupons with value equal to c per unit of time and with principal equal to B. The 
maturity date for both bonds is the same and the firm will pay dividends d per unit of time. 
On the assumptions that only the senior debt is fully guaranteed and the junior debt is non-
31Tllis situation is highly unlikely, i.e. that a firm under a loan guarantee will pay dividends. 
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guaranteed, the value of the fully guaranteed debt is given by the sum of the values of the 
non-guaranteed debt and the loan guarantee. The values of non-guaranteed debt and of 
loan guarantee can be calculated using equations (1.25) and (1.26) respectively, with 
P=c+c' +d, and p=c. Conditions for the debt's value are given by equations (1 .27), (1 .29) 
and (1 .31), while conditions for the value of the loan guarantee are given by equations 
(1 .28), (1 .30a) and (1 .32). 
The value of the junior debt, when it is fully guaranteed and the senior debt is non-
guaranteed, is the sum of the values of non-guaranteed junior debt and loan guarantees, 
given by equations (1.25) and (1 .26), with P=c+c'+d, and p=c'. However, based on the 
assumption that the junior debt is subordinated to the senior debt, implying that the non-
guaranteed junior debt will receive only the difference between the firm's assets value and 
the face value of the senior bond, the terminal condition of the value of the non-
guaranteed junior debt is given by 
D(V, 0) = min (B', max (0, V - B)), (1.35) 
Based on the same argument, if the value of the firm's assets should be less than the sum 
of the face values of junior and senior bonds, the guarantor must pay any differences 
between those two values up to the face value of the junior debt. Thus, the terminal 
condition of the value of the loan guarantee is given by 
D(V, 0) = min (B' , max (0, B' + B - V)) . (1 .36) 
The boundary conditions are the same as for the case of the fully guaranteed senior debt 
described above. 
The last case evaluated in the paper is the case of a callable coupon debt with guarantees. 
Again, equations (1.25) and (1 .26) can be used to evaluate the value of the non-
guaranteed callable debt and its guarantee, where P=c+d, and p =c. However, in contrast 
to the non-callable bond, depending on the value of the firm's assets (=V (-c)) at time -c -- if 
V(-c)~ K(-c), where K(-c) is the value of callable debt at time 't--it may be optimal for the 
stockholders to call the debt. Thus, the upper boundary condition of the value of the 
callable debt is given by 
D(V (-c),-c) = K(-c). (1.37) 
If the stockholders recall the debt, there is no need for a guarantee. Thus, the value of the 
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loan guarantee will be equal to zero. The upper boundary condition of the value of the 
loan guarantee is given by 
D(V (t);t) = o. (1.38) 
The terminal and lower boundary conditions of the value of the loan guarantee is given by 
equations (1 .27) and (1.29) respectively. The terminal and lower boundary conditions of 
the value of the guarantee is given by equations (1.28) and (1.30a) respectively. The value 
of the guaranteed debt is given by the sum of the values of the non-guaranteed callable 
debt and its guarantee. 
As in the case of Sosin's model, the result of the simulation presented at the end of the 
Jones and Masson's paper suggest that the value of the guarantees moves together with 
the instantaneous variance of return on the asset's value. 
1.2.2.4. The Model of Chen, Chen and Sears: the Case of Chrysler Corporation 
A rare example of the use of discrete time models to evaluate Government loan guarantees 
is the model of Chen, Chen and Sears32 . A theoretical model, based on a risk-neutral 
valuation relationship (RNVR) in discrete time, 33 is presented in the first part of their 
paper, while the second part of their paper presents an empirical analysis of the case of 
Chrysler corporation. 34 
The two-period model 1s constructed around the company (in this case Chrysler 
corporation) which in the first period issues a combination of common stock (=E) and 
discounted bonds/senior debt (=S) with face value (=Di) at maturity date and in the second 
period issues a junior bond under the Government loan guarantee. The firm's cash flow at 
maturity date, (=V) is normally distributed. 
32Chen, A. , Chen, K., Sears, R. "The value of loan guarantees: The case of Chrysler corporation", 
Research in Finance, (1986, vol. 6, pp. 101- 117) 
33 According to Brennan, "a valuation relationship is a formula relating the value of contingent claim, or 
its derivatives, to the value of the underlying asset and other exogenous parameters". Brennan, M. J., "The 
pricing of contingent claims in discrete time models", The Journal of Finance, (1977, vol. 34, pp. 56-68) 
34At the end of 1979, Chrysler corporation incurred deficit of US$ 1 billion. Thus, without help, the 
corporation would have become bankrupt. With bankruptcy came the prospect of unemployment of 
thousands of workers and almost US$ 1.8 billion in liabilities faced by the US government in pension and 
unemployment compensation. At the beginning of 1980, American President Carter provided US$ 1.5 
billion to the corporation in government loan guarantees. This made it possible for Chrysler to obtain new 
loans on the credit market and to restructure itself. 
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If, at maturity date in the first period, the company's cash flow is greater than its debt, 
V1 >Di, the payment to the stock holders (YE) will be V1 -D1. If the value of the company's 
cash flow at maturity is less than or equal to D 1 the stockholders will receive nothing. 
Thus, according to the model and based on RNVR, the current market value of the 
company (=VE) can be expressed as 
(1 .39) 
and the current market value of the senior debt ( = V8) is 
(1.40) 
where subscript O denotes current values, R is 1 plus the risk-free interest rate, cr is the 
standard deviation of the cash flow at the maturity date of period one, N( ... ) is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution, n( ... ) is the standard normal density function, and 
- - ~R K - DI - ~R h -K 0 - --, 1 - , t US V0- VE+V8 • 
cr cr 
At the beginning of the second period, the company, in order to finance a new risky 
project, issues a junior debt with a face value of D2 that is guaranteed by the Government. 
The post- investment total cash flow (=V3) will be V3=V 1+V2 The cash-flow variance is 
equal to cr! . If, at maturity date in the second period, the company's cash flow is greater 
than its total debt (=B), where B=D1+D2, the payment to the stock holders (=Y; ) will be 
~ -B. If the value of the company's cash flow at maturity is less than or equal to B, the 
stockholders will receive nothing and senior bondholders will receive ~, and if the post-
investment value of the cash flows is less than zero, both of them will receive nothing. 
The case of junior bondholders is different. Due to the existence of the Government 
guarantee at maturity date they will receive the full face value of their bonds. Expressed in 
abbreviated form the final payoff to junior bondholders (=Y; ) will be 
D2 if ~ ~B 
y; = D2 if DI < V 3 < B 
D2 if VJ s o 
Thus, according to the model, the market value of the common stock and senior debt 
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where ~P is the post-investment current value of the company, and }(} 8 = 
0 
CT F 
K' = Dl -~PR K' = -~PR 
1 ' 0 
The market value of the junior debt, without (=V1) and with (=v; ) the Government 
guarantee, is given by 
and 
V1 = D~-1N(-K'2) + [~P - D1R·1][N(-K'i) -N(-K'8 )] + R·1aF[n(-K'i) - n(-K'8 )], 
(1.43) 
v: =D~-1 (1.44) 
D -VPR 
where K' = 2 0 
1 
Subtracting equation (1.43) from equation (1.44) gives the value of the Government loan 
guarantee (VG) as VG= V; - v; 
or 
VG= D~-1[1 - N(-K')] - [~P - D 1R- 1][N(-K'i) - N(-K'8)] - R- 1aF[n(-K'i) - n(-K'8)] 
(1.45) 
As mentioned, the second part of this paper is an empirical study of the Chrysler 
corporation. In order to analyse the effect of the Government loan guarantee on the value 
of Chrysler's common stock and debt, three hypotheses were developed. The hypotheses 
were: 
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H1: The Government loan guarantee should bring benefits to senior bondholders. 
H2: The Government loan guarantee should bring benefits to shareholders of Chrysler. 
H3: The risk level of Chrysler's common stock should be lower with the Government 
loan guarantee. 
The technique used by the authors was that of 'intervention analysis'. Daily stock return 
data for Chrysler and the value-weighted stock index for the period from July 1977 to the 
end of September 1980 were used in the analysis. The results of their analysis confirm the 
first two hypotheses as correct. Based on the results of the analysis, the conclusion was 
that investors reacted positively to the announcement of the Government support to 
Chrysler, and that both shareholders and senior bondholders benefited from the guarantee. 
This confirmed the theoretical results obtained in the first part of the paper. Hypothesis 
number 3 was rejected. Chrysler behaved as any profit maximising firm. The total level of 
risk was increased after the introduction of the Government loan guarantee. The authors 
concluded that, based on their results, there was need for the Government intervention. 
Moreover, the Government should have charged a fee in exchange for the guarantee, since 
the loan guarantee provided value to the firm's owners and creditors. This was also the 
general conclusion of Merton, So sin and Jones and Masson. 
SUMMARY 
Chapter One of this paper has attempted to give an broad picture of the theoretical 
framework which is employed herein to explain some of the consequences of loan 
guarantees and to present some of the theoretical models which can be used to evaluate 
the likely cost of the proposed Mortgage Indemnity Scheme. As was illustrated by Fried's 
general model of portfolio choice, and by Williamson's model of credit with costly state 
verification, with the introduction of Government loan guarantees in situations where 
there is credit rationing in the loan market--as it is the case in the South African home-loan 
market--the end result could also involve an increase in the overall interest rates paid by 
the borrowers. However, not all borrowers will be affected equally, with such likely 
movements of the interest rates. Due to the existence of the Government loan guarantee, 
which discriminates amongst different categories of the borrowers, the targeted borrowers 
will pay lower interest rates--which will, nevertheless, still be higher than interest rates 
before introduction of the Government loan guarantees--while other borrowers will pay 
the market interest rates of the day. 
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As far as the value of the Government loan guarantee to both bondholders and 
shareholders is concerned, the argument has been that loan guarantee has a value to both 
lenders and borrowers. Thus, Merton--with his model of an analytic derivation of the cost 
of loan guarantees--has illustrated that in the case when the company is faced by the 
inability to meet its debt obligation at the maturity date, where there is a Government loan 
guarantee the bondholders will receive the full face value of the bond and the Government 
will incur a net payment, or loss, equal to the difference between the payment to 
bondholders and the value of the firm's assets. 
As far as Sosin's model is concerned, it has been illustrated that--in the case of the 
company's senior and junior bond and on the assumption that the Government would 
provide the company with a loan guarantee for a fraction of the junior debt equal to a at 
zero cost because the project is politically and socially beneficial in spite of its financial 
unfeasibility--the value of the senior debt will be unaffected with the introduction of loan 
guarantee in the model. At time of maturity, the payment of the senior bond is secured by 
the introduction of the junior bond, while the payment of the junior bond is secured by the 
Government guarantee. The theoretical value of the loan guarantee and the potential cost 
to a Government is the difference of the aggregate market value of the firm with, and 
without, the Government guarantee. According to Sosin, this will be the cost to the 
Government if the Government were to buy the guarantee in a competitive market. Based 
on his simulation results, Sosin concluded that the cost of loan guarantee moves in the 
same direction as the variance of the rate of return on the firm's assets. 
Jones and Masson have evaluated four types of debt: (a) a fully guaranteed issue of non-
callable coupon debt; (b) a partially guaranteed issue of non-callable coupon debt; ( c) a 
junior and a senior issue of non-callable coupon debt with guarantees; and ( d) a callable 
coupon debt with guarantees. They illustrated that, irrespective of the company's asset 
value at the maturity date, the bondholders will receive--in the presence of the 
Government loan guarantee--the full face value of the bond. However, the value of the 
guarantee moves together with the instantaneous variance of return on the asset's value. 
Chen, Chen and Sear's model is a rare example of the use of discrete time models to 
evaluate Government loan guarantees. The two-period model is constructed around the 
company--Chrysler corporation--that in the first period issues a combination of common 
stock and discounted senior bond and in the second period issues a junior bond under the 
Government loan guarantee. They argued that at the maturity date if the company's cash 
flow is greater than its debt, the senior bondholder will receive the full face value of their 
32 
bonds, while in the opposite case, they will receive nothing. The case of junior 
bondholders is different. Due to the existence of the Government guarantee at maturity 
date they will receive the full face value of their bonds irrespective of the value of the 
company's cash flows. 
Moreover, based on the results of their empirical analysis, they concluded that investors 
who invested in Chrysler's bonds reacted positively to the announcement of the 
Government's support to Chrysler, and that both shareholders and senior bondholders 
benefited from the guarantee. Thus the authors concluded that the Government should 
have charged a fee in exchange for its guarantee, since the loan guarantee provided value 
to the firm's owner and creditors. 
Thus, in spite of some differences between the models, the general conclusion is that the 
Government loan guarantee has a positive value to both lenders and borrowers and that--
based on these positive values of the Government loan guarantees--the Government 
should charge a fee in exchange for its guarantee. Moreover, the general conclusion is that 
the value of the Government loan guarantee is positively related to the standard deviation 




SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSING CRISIS 
2.1. Housing Crisis 
Amongst the disastrous consequences of apartheid, the housing crisis is one of the worst. 
Although there are presently no comprehensive statistical data regarding housing, some 
estimates suggest that in 1995, of approximately 7.9 million South African households 
with an average of 4. 9735 people per household, 1. 7 million live in shacks on unsecured 
land and about 620,000 in shacks on serviced sites. About 2.1 million individuals live in 
hostels. 36 The size of the housing backlog varies with geographic area as indicated by 
Table 2-1, below.37 
TABLE 2-1 
The Estimated Present and Future Urban Housing Backlog 
of the Former South African Provinces 
PWV E. Cape W. Cape Natal Total SA 
Urban oooulation as % of total 81 45 90 51 61 
Income as % of total (1993 prices) 
R 0-500 6 14 4 10 9 
R 500-1500 18 33 15 30 26 
R 1500+ 76 13 81 60 65 
Housing backlog 1990 
No of dwellings if standard 4-room 
houses ('000) 337 188 94 448 1,398 
Future shortage 
1990 - 2010 ('000) 1,162 384 339 726 3,100 
Source: Walker, N. (1993 , pp. 31). 
As it is true that not everyone was equally affected by apartheid, so it is also true that the 
housing backlog is not equally spread over all population groups. The largest housing 
backlog is amongst the African population, and the second largest is that of the Coloured 
population. Table 2-2 presents some estimates regarding the present and the future 
housing demand in Western Cape province, as an illustration of the different size of 
35"White Paper; A new housing policy and strategy for South Africa" , Government Gazette, (23 December 
1994, vol. 354, no. 16178, pp. 4), [hereafter cited as White Paper on Housing] . 
36Barnard, D. "Housing, the reconstruction challenge", Prodder Newsletter, (November 1994, vol. 6, 
No.4) The estimate given by the White Paper on Housing is a slightly different. There are 8.3 million 
households with 4.7 persons per household, and with 1.06 million living in shacks. The estimated housing 
backlog for 1995 is 1.5 million units. White Paper on Housing, op.cit. 
37Walker, N. "A new approach to housing delivery: Some ideas for discussion" , Research Report No. 1, 
(1993 , Institute for Local Governance and Development, University of Western Cape). The numbers for 
the rural population are similar, with the estimated backlog for the period 1990-2010 equal to 1,341,000 
units. 
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housing backlog amongst different population groups. 38 
TABLE 2-2 
Projected Housing Demand for the Western Province 
(1990 to 2005 year) 
Backlog Whites Coloured Africans Asians Total 
1990 - 59,881 91 ,294 - 151,175 
1995 11 ,192 30,405 66,239 849 108,685 
2000 7,969 28,390 90,890 764 128,013 
2005 3,734 23,524 114,264 609 142,131 
Total: 22,895 142,201 362,687 2,222 530,005 
Source: du Plessis, (1992, pp. 4) 
2.2. Housing Backlog: Historical Background 
The differences in the size of the housing backlog presented in Table 2-2 are importantly 
influenced by the State's approach towards housing. For a long period, from roughly the 
late l 940's to the late l 970's and early l 980's, the State's approach toward the social 
'necessities' of the population was what may be denoted as the "welfare approach" . That is, 
it was widely accepted that the State should provide housing for low-income households. 
However, the State's approach toward the social requirements of the non-white 
population, which was controlled by the apartheid laws, was entirely different from that 
toward the white population. Under the policy of racial segregation, in order to control 
and influence the movements and economic activity of the non-white population, and in 
particular that of the African population in the urban areas, the State took charge of 
almost all housing for Africans. Thus, for a time, the State was producing, administering, 
controlling and allocating almost all the African housing. The result was an artificial 
creation of housing shortages and consequently a massive backlog. Such policy also 
created a widespread mentality of dependence amongst a large part of the South African 
population. 39 
Since the late l 970's and early l 980's, the State's approach towards housing has changed. 
It has shifted, increasingly, towards the privatisation of housing supply and ownership. 
38du Plessis, S. "Housing in Working Papers on the Economy of the Western Cape", (WESGRO, Cape 
Town, March, 1992.) One needs to bear in its mind that the coloured population is a majority in the 
Western Cape province (approximately 55% of the total population). 
39The long waiting lists for the residential units independently of the race are the proof. 
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The emphasis has shifted from the State as provider, to the State as 'facilitator' for a 
number of housing-related functions. As a result of the new policy, the Urban Areas Act 
was amended in 1978. The amendments introduced the new 99-year leasehold right, 
alongside the already available 30-years leasehold, for the non-white population. These 
amendments have been directed toward the African population in particular. For an initial 
period of five years the response was very poor, with only 1, 727 leases being registered. 
The reason was that the cost of establishing a leasehold was substantially higher than for 
renting a comparable property. In 1983, as the next step towards greater private 
ownership, the State initiated the sale of almost 500,000 housing units. Once more, the 
response was poor for a variety of reasons. 
2.3. The Current Approaches Towards Housing 
According to Walker,40 the various forms of the current approach to housing can be 
divided into "four broad housing delivery options", which may be sub-divided further into 
a number of sub-options. Table 2-3 presents four delivery options with these related sub-
options. 
TABLE 2-3 
The Current Housing Options 
Primary options Sub-options 
Unaided self-help - informal settlements 
- illegal sub-divisions 
- backyard shacks 
- floating squatters 
Supported self-help 
.. 
- emergency service prov1s1on 
- roll-over upgrading 
- community-sensitive in-site upgrading 
Projected-initiated self-help - self-help projects 
- IDT sponsored projects 
Conventional housing - State rental sector 
- public rental sector 
- State and private sector developed 
ownership units 
Source: Walker, N. (1993, pp. 18) 
An explanation of the primary options of Table 2-3 is in order: 
40Walker, N. op. cit. pp. 17-21 
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• Unaided self help--This delivery option refers, in general, to informal settlements. Such 
settlements are only quasi-legal. In general, the occupied sites are non-serviced and 
without any infrastructure. The erected dwellings units are mostly built from scrap 
materials. 
• Supported self-help--In general, this form of housing refers to an upgraded informal 
settlement, described above. Usually, upgrading is initiated by the settlers themselves. 
The upgrading is in the form of basic services such as electricity and communal water 
taps, and very seldom takes the form of upgrading the dwellings themselves. In recent 
years, the State and various parastatal and private organisations have also been 
involved in upgrading the informal settlements. 
• Project-initiated self-help--This approach is very similar to that of supported self-help. 
The difference is that the sites are already serviced with some basic infrastructure 
before the settlers begin occupying the sites. In many cases the State, or one of the 
parastatals, i.e. Independent Development Trust (which has been subsidised by the 
State), are the providers and facilitators of the serviced sites. The level of services and 
infrastructure can vary greatly from the one place to the other place; however, in 
general, the level of services are limited to water and electricity supply and the removal 
of wastage. 
• Conventional housing--This delivery option refers to completed dwellings units in 
various forms, i.e. free standing houses, semi-detached housing or multi-story blocks 
of flats. In the past few years, the State was--to a lesser degree--involved in this 
delivery option. 
2.4. Current Constraints to the Solution of Housing Crisis 
With the recent democratisation of the country and with the 1994 general election, 
apartheid has been abandoned completely. Thus, the major factor that previously 
influenced the housing crisis no longer exists. Nonetheless, there are still numerous other 
factors that act as constraints to the solution of the housing crisis. Some of the major 
constraints are as follows: 
• Non-existence of a single, coherent State policy towards housing: 
Previous policies resulted in fragmentation of the housing function amongst a 
number of different Government departments as well as fragmentation at the 
provincial and regional level. This fragmentation has been reflected in the inability 
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of the State to offer or to initiate a solution to housing crisis in the past. 
• Access to finance : 
At present, access to mortgage loans is largely denied to the majority of the South 
African population. The major reasons for this denial are that such mortgages are 
largely not affordable41 and are of limited profitability to financial institutions. 42 
However, and in particular during l 980's, due to the continuous boycott of 
repayments for home-loans, almost all financial institutions cancelled their 
involvement with the low-cost housing market. The African population has been 
particularly severely adversely affected by this move. 
• Affordability of housing: 
The majority of homeless households can afford only houses under R35,000,43 and 
there are limited number of such low-cost houses on the market. This is due to the 
withdrawal of the State as a provider of such housing, and to the reluctance of the 
private sector to enter this market due to a low profit margins in this market. 44 
Another problem is high infrastructure cost related to the development of the sites 
for such low-cost housing. 45 
• Availability of the land; 
As a legacy of apartheid, the majority of the South African cities are divided on a 
racial basis. In addition, the majority of the work force must travel long distances 
from their homes to their place of work. In order to make cities less racially 
divided and to put a majority of the population closer to their place of work, new 
41Due to the low level of income earned by the majority of African population, it is almost impossible for 
them to afford high monthly mortgage payments or to receive substantial amount of credit. 
42The administrative cost is not especially different between the loans of differing sizes. 1_'aking in 
consideration the higher risk involved with small loans, the real costs are however even greater. Here 
"small loan" refer to the loans under R30,000. However, according to John Smale, managing director of 
NBS Bank "The low income housing market will be one of the fastest growing markets in the years 
ahead. We will go into it because it is profitable and it is right thing to do", (Emphasis added) . Sunday 
Times, "Business Times", May 7, 1995, n.p. 
43 According to the White Paper on Housing, almost 40-55% of households in need of housing will be 
dependent only on the state subsidisation and/or on their own resources, if any, to solve their basic 
housing needs. White Paper on Housing, op. cit. pp. 20. 
44Additionally. the question can be raised about the ability of the construction industry to met the targeted 
300,000 units of low-cost housing in the consequent years. 
45The cost of tarred roads per site is in the range ofRl ,500-2,000. (du Plessis, C. op.cit. pp. 8.) The 
average cost of plan approval incurred by the developers in private sector in Western Cape for the house 
under RS0,000 is R512 while water connection is R617. (Walker, N. op.cit. pp. 31) 
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residential units/areas could be developed within existing (white) residential areas 
or close to existing industrial areas. The difficulties with such 'solutions' is that 
there is very little space left for major housing developments and that land which 
does exist is too expensive for low income housing. Thus, the only real solution is 
to acquire available land around big cities, which then does not solve the problem 
of racial division nor the problem of the long distance travel to the workplace. 
2.5. The Proposed Government Housing Policy 
Recognising housing as one of its priorities, in its first year in power, the Government of 
National Unity has given much attention to the housing crisis. As a result at the end of 
1994, the Government published its proposed housing policy in a White Paper on 
Housing. 
2.5.1. The White Paper on Housing 
In general, the Government's 'White Paper on Housing' may be divided into two parts: the 
first part of the paper provides a general analysis of the current South African housing 
situation, while the second part spells out a number of strategies and policies aimed at a 
long run solution to this crisis. 
The general idea which undergirds the Paper, is that "housing is a basic human right" and 
almost the entire Government approach towards housing is based on this particular 
principle. However, there is a strong recognition of the limited State's financial, human and 
material resources. Thus, despite the Government's long run intention to act only as a 
"facilitator" rather then a "deliverer", it is aware that, in the short run, there is still a strong 
need for direct Government involvement in the low-income housing market. 
Proposed Government direct involvement is largely limited to devising a framework for 
State subsidies for first-time home buyers. However, the Government is also aware 
that--at least in the short run--there is still the need for the Government to act as a direct 
deliverer of residential units.46 The vehicle the Government of National Unity has chosen 
for doing so is to give to first-time buyers a subsidy which may be used as a down-
payment to the provider of a home. Table 2-4, below, describes the proposed State 
subsidy scheme for first-time home buyers. 
46This is particularly true for the lowest end of the housing market which consists of households that earn 
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TABLE 2-4 
The Conditions and the Value of the State Subsidies 
for the First Time Buyers 
Joint spouse monthly The value of the State 
mcome subsidy 
1 2 
0 - 800 15,000 
801 - 1,500 12,500 
1501 - 2,500 9,500 
2501 - 3,500 5,000 
> 3,501 0 
Source: The White Paper, 1994, pp. 46 
On the other hand, to fulfil its role as a 'facilitator', the Government's intention is to : 
(1) establish a number of housing-related institutions; and, 
(2) to stabilise the housing environment. 
Amongst the proposed housing-related institutions to be established are: 
• The National and Provincial Housing Ministries;47 
• The National and Provincial Housing Boards. These boards will act mainly as a 
advisors to the Ministry of Housing for the variety of questions related to housing: 
• The National Housing Finance Corporation. In light of the Government's desire for 
a long-run solution, the establishment of the Corporation will be one of the most 
important parts of the solution. The major function of the proposed Finance 
Corporation will be to release housing finance at the wholesale level through the 
policies such as: 
partial underwriting ofloans made by authorised financial institutions 
to the lower end of housing market; 
securisation of the housing loans; and, 
issuing own financial papers for the purpose of funding or the partial 
underwriting of paper issued by the banks. 
less than R80J) per month 
47These ministries have already been in the place at the time of writing this paper. 
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The Government's purpose with its policy of stabilisation of the housing environment is to 
induce major South African banks to re-enter the low-income housing market, which they 
earlier abandoned. However, the most important factors that influenced the banks' 
decisions to leave this market were (a) the introduction of the boycott of bond and other 
services repayments and (b) the ever-increasing level of violence in non-white residential 
areas that led to an almost completely break-down in law and order.48 Thus, in order to 
induce the residents of these residential areas to pay their bond and for service obligation, 
at the beginning of 1995 the Government has launched a massive housing education 
campaign (Masakhane) aimed to change this alleged 'culture of non-payment' toward a 
'culture of payments' . Simultaneously with this mass-campaign, the Government has 
proposed to establish the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, which is described in more details 
below. 
Some of the other proposals which are presented in the White Paper are related to the 
availability of land for low-cost housing and to consumer protection. As far as land is 
concerned, the Government's proposal is that public land owned by the State, and in 
particular, the land in the vicinity of urban areas, needs to be considered for the purpose 
of facilitating the low-income housing first. 
2.5.2. The Government Indemnity Scheme Proposal49 
To a significant extent, the proposed Government housing solution, at least in its initial 
phase, depends on the willingness of the major South African financial institutions to lend 
money to the lower end of the housing market. Currently only the major banks have the 
necessary infrastructure and sufficient financial resources to support the proposed 
Government housing policy. However, the problem is that--given their negative experience 
and substantial loses caused by forces beyond their control5°--banks are not prepared to 
enter the market without some preconditions. One of these preconditions is that they be 
indemnified against payment default. 
In order to meet this pre-conditions, the Government has proposed the establishment of 
the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme (MIS), with the purpose of protecting the banks from 
incurring loses due to forces beyond their control. 
48The payment's boycott has been introduced as a part of the struggle against the apartheid. 
49The White Paper on Housing op.cit. pp. 48-49. 
50The payment's boycott, the high level of violence in townships, the inability or unwillingness of the 
government of the day to force the laws and to vacate these residential units. 
42 
/ 
The most important characteristics of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme are as follows : 
• Only accredited banks will be covered by the MIS; 
• The circumstances under which the banks will be indemnified will be mutually 
agreed in advance; 
• In granting home loans, the banks will have to follow procedures established in 
consultation with those in charge of the MIS programme; and, 
• The initial period of the MIS will be three years. 51 
As point of a separate agreement, however, though in much the same way as part of the 
MIS, the Government has also agreed to extend the coverage of the MIS to approximately 
16,000 residential units already under court orders for repossession. The reason for this 
extension of the MIS programme is a recognition by the State of its inability to effectively 
execute court orders for repossessions. The Government's proposal is that, during the 
initial three years of the duration of the MIS, it will make additional efforts to enforce 
those court orders. Should, during those three years, the Government be unsuccessful in 
its effort to enforce the law, then it will purchase these residential units under the terms of 
the MIS. 
Actually, with the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, the accredited banks will be given--
without cost to them--an "insurance policy" against default of payment, with the 
Government acting as the policy writer. However, as has been shown by Merton, this is 
equivalent to buying and writing a Put option, and this feature of the Government's 
Mortgage Indemnity Scheme will be exploited in the consequent chapter to calculate the 
'real' value of the scheme to the South African Government and, ultimately, to the South 
African tax-payers. 
51The very practical question is who will then lend money for a period longer then the initial three years. 
The possible solution to this problem can be found in the proposed establishment of the National Housing 
Finance Corporation which could take over the guarantee of the loans for the rest of the repayment period 
of the loan. 
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CHAPTER3 
DERIVATION OF A MODEL 
OF THE COST OF 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 
PROPOSED 
MORTGAGE INDEMNITY SCHEME 
3.1. The Model of Estimation of the Cost of the Indemnity Scheme to the 
South African Government 
As it has been showed by the models presented in Chapter 1, Option Pricing Theory can 
be successfully used to evaluate the cost of Government guarantees of loans granted to 
firms . With modest modification, the same general models can also be used to evaluate the 
cost of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme proposed by the South African Government as a 
part of its solution for housing crisis. The model which will be used here in to calculate the 
likely cost of the indemnity scheme is similar to Merton's formulation for the analytic 
derivation of the cost of loan guarantees. As the model has already been presented above 
(section 1.2.2.1.), only its major features are presented, and then but briefly, below. 
3.1.1. Merton's Model 
The five basic assumption of Merton's model are:52 
(1) There exists a risky asset that can be bought and sold freely on the market at some 
current price S. The risky asset pays no dividends nor is there other income 
dispersal before the option's expiration date. There are no restrictions to short 
selling. 
(2) The rate of interest at which one can lend or borrow without risk is fixed and 
interest accrues on a continuous basis at a rater. 
(3) The price of the underlying risky asset is continuous in time, and follows a random 
walk. The instantaneous mean and variance of the price change are proportional to 
the current price of the security, so that the mean and variance of the (continuously 
compounded) rate of return per unit time both have constant values. This implies 
that the distribution of the security's current price over any given period will be log 
normal. 53 
(4) There are no factors--such as taxes, transaction costs, or margin requirements--
that can affect a rate of return on a risky assets. 
52The assumptions are the Black-Scholes assumptions presented in section 1.2.1.1. 
53The feature of the log normal distribution is that price can not be negative and that the size of the 
average price change is larger as price levels are higher. 
45 
(5) The option can be exercised only at the time of expiration T, i.e. the option is a 
European option. 
Thus, according to Merton's model, the value of the loan guarantee is given by: 
(3.1) 
and the value of the loan guarantee as a fraction of the value of the loan covered by the 
guarantee, i.e. the insurance premium, is given by: 
where: 
G(T) 
__ = 1- e-<R(T) - r)T. 
Be -rT 
(3.2) 
G( 'I) = the value of the loan guarantee; 
B = promised payment on the bond issues; 
V = the market value of a firm's assets at time of maturity; 
r = the instantaneous risk-free interest rate; 
T = time to bond maturity; 
R = the promised bond yield; 
log(;)-(r+f )r 
- crJf 
cr2 = the variance rate per unit time of the logarithmic changes in the value of 
the assets. 
Although the above assumptions are too restrictive, m order to solve the model, 
assumptions (1), (2)54 and (3) have been taken as given. As far as assumption (4) is 
54Based on fact that the Reserve Bank changed interest rate four times during 1994, and it has already 
changed interest rate one more time in 1995. 
46 
concerned, this assumption needs to be relaxed so as to allow for the influence of a range 
of default rates on bank returns. Assumption (5) is presumably a realistic one, taking into 
consideration that the households affected by the indemnity scheme, have low levels of 
income, which implies that the probability ofloan pre-payment is quite unlikely. 
As the model was originally constructed to evaluate the value and cost of the guarantees 
related to loans granted to firm, some necessary modifications must to be made before the 
model can be used to evaluate the likely cost of the indemnity scheme. 
3.1.2. The Model's Modifications 
Modifications of Merton's equations (3 .1) and (3 .2) must be made for use in the housing 
model. Thus, these modified variables may be defined as follows : 
• B the total value of housing loans granted within the period covered by 
the indemnity scheme; 
• v the total market value of housing at the end of the period covered by 
the indemnity scheme; 
• a2 the variance rate per unit time of the logarithmic changes in the 
market value of housing; 
• T the period within which the indemnity scheme is exercised; and 
• R the interest rate on housing loans granted; while the variables r, x 1, x 2 
and G(1) are the same as above. 
In order to calculate the value of the Government mortgage indemnity scheme (MIS), 
some additional assumptions about the model have been made. These additional 
assumptions are as follows: 
Al : The duration of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme is 3 years; 
A2: The amortisation period of the loans is 15 years;55 
55 A difficulty is that the initial period of indemnity is 3 years. On the other hand, the usual repayment 
period of housing loans is 15 to 20 years, which means that financial institutions would be uncovered for 
at least 12 years. The solution may be, as suggested by the Government White Paper, for the Finance 
Corporation to take over the loan guarantee for the rest of the repayment period. 
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A3 : In the first year there will be 50, 000 loans granted, and in each of the 
second and third years the number of loans granted will increase to 
100,000; 
A4: The instantaneous risk-free interest rate is equal to 16.67% proxied by the 
returns on the South African government bond R150;56 
AS : The rate of default ( =d1) is a positive function of the interest rate; 
A6: The rate of depreciation ( =d~ is a function of the time and is invariant to 
the value of the house. 
3.2. Data Used for the Calculations 
The advantage and usefulness of financial models based on Option Pricing Theory is that 
the data for the variables used in the models are readily observable and easily obtained. In 
cases where some variables can not be observed directly such variables may be easily 
estimated. As far as the variables used in the housing model are concerned, most must be 
estimated. This is due to the fact that the Government housing programme is still in its 
initial phase and most of the relevant data does not yet exist. 
Thus, we have here assumed that the value of the home loans granted is a function of the 
household's income. The value of a home loan is determined on the assumption that the 
household's monthly payment of the bond will be approximately 25% of its monthly 
income with the interest rate on home loans equal to the current interest rate prevailing on 
the market at the time of writing this paper and it is equal to 17.25%.57 
Table 3-1 , below, presents the estimated ranges of home loans according to the joint 
spousal monthly income and with an interest rate of 17.25% per annum. Table 4.1 also 
presents an estimation of the possible range of the initial value of residential units, which is 
the sum of the value of the home loans granted, the value of the State's subsidies and the 
value of the individual's contributory payment. 
56Financial Mail, 21 April 1995, n.p. 





0 - 800 
801 - 1,500 
1,501 - 2,500 
2,501 - 3,500 
3,501 - 4,500 
4,501 - 5,500 
5,501 - 6,500 
> 6,501 
TABLE 3-1 
Data Used in Calculation of the Cost of 
the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme 
Monthly Range of Loans59 State Individual 
repayment of the Subsidy contribution60 
loan58 
2 3 4 5 
0 - 157 0 - 10,000 15,000 0 - 1,000 
157 - 394 10,000 - 25,000 12,500 1,000 - 2,500 
394 - 630 25,000 - 40,000 9,500 2,500 - 4,000 
630 - 866 40,000 - 55 ,000 5,000 4,000 - 5,500 
866 - 1,090 55 ,000 - 70,000 0 5,500 - 7,000 
1,090 - 1,323 70,000 - 85,000 0 7,000 - 8,500 
1,323 - 1,557 85,000 - 100,000 0 8,500 - 10,000 
> 1,575 > 100,000 0 > 10,000 
Note: All amounts are in Rand tenns. 




15,000 - 26,000 
23,500 - 40,000 
37,000 - 53,500 
49,000 - 65,500 
60,500 - 77,000 
77,000 - 93,500 
93,500 - 110,000 
> 110,000 
The cost of the MIS is estimated for the range of the constant change of the market value 
of the residential units, (=cr). Thus, cr ranges from 5% to 50%.61 The duration of the 
proposed Mortgage Indemnity Scheme is given by the White Paper on Housing and is 
assumed fixed at 3 years. As mentioned, the risk-free interest rate is assumed to be equal 
to the returns on RSA 150 bond and is equal to 16.67%. 
As data for market value of low income housing is non-existent, it can not be observed 
directly or estimated by comparison with similar data. In the solution presented here, this 
data is simulated and, using time series so derived, the value of the relevant variables has 
been calculated. Thus, these simulated variables can be used in the model of estimation of 
the cost of the indemnity scheme to the South African Government. The simulation 
process used to simulate data for this variable is a Monte Carlo process, and is described 
in some more details below. 
58The value of the loan is amortised over a period of 15 years at interest of 17.5% per annum. 
59The range of loans are based on assumption that household's monthly repayment is around 25% of its 
monthly income. 
60Based on 10% of the value of the loan 
61The Rode's Report estimates that the average price change of the residential units at the upper end of the 
market was 23.4% in 1994 , 13.7% for the middle end of the market and 11.4% for the lower-priced 
homes. Cape Times, (17 April 1995, pp. 18) 
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3.3. Monte Carlo Simulation 
According to Newman and Odell62 the term 'Monte Carlo' denotes vanous sampling 
techniques that are "used to study probabilistic and systems simulation problems, as well 
as deterministic problems" . 63 The most common use of the Monte Carlo techniques is in 
cases when--for various reasons--some equation can not be solved by the usual numerical 
methods--or in other words--it can not be expressed explicitly through its parameters, 64 
thus than "there may exist a stochastic process with a distribution or parameters which 
[do] satisfy the equation"65 and make it possible to solve the equation for given values of 
the parameters. However, this requires estimating the numerical value of the parameter by 
generating a series ( of size n) of random numbers ( =x;) . 
Associated with such generated series of random numbers ( =x;) is a cumulative distribution 
function (=F(y)) , which is defined as the probability that the random numbers (=x;) thus 
generated has a particular value not exceeding a prescribed value of y. 66 The frequency of 
the random numbers is given by the frequency function f (x), which may also be called a 
probability-density-function. 
Thus, if g(xi) is a function of xi, 67 so the expectation ( or mean value(= x)) of g is given by 
x = f g(x)dF(y), (3 .3) 
A 
or, if F(y) has the derivative f(x) , then x can be expressed as 
x = f g(x)f (x)dx, (3.4) 
A 
where f f(x)dx = 1, and A denotes a range of integration. 
A 
62Newman, T. , and Odell, P., The generation ofrandom variates, (Charles Griffin & Co. Ltd, London, 
1971) 
63Jbid., pp. l 
64 As it is case with the housing model above because of the non-existence of the real world data for the 
market value of the residential units. 
65Newman, T., and Odell, P., op.cit., pp. 4 
66Hammersley, J. , and Handscomb, D. Monte Carlo Methods, ( Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, 1965) 
67Jbid. 
Boyle, P. "Options: A Monte Carlo approach" , Journal of Financial Economics, (vol. 4, 1977, 
pp. 323 - 338); 
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In order to estimate the value of x, a number ( =n) of sample values ( =x;) is generated at 




1 n - L g(x;), 
n i= l 






1 n A ( _ ) L (g(x;) - x)2. 




The factor fn in the denominator in equation (3 . 6) implies that, in order to reduce the 
standard error of the estimate by a given factor n, the number of observations needs to be 
increased by the factor n2. 
An alternative method of reducing the standard error of the estimate is the 'control variate' 
method. Some other variance-reducing techniques are 'importance sampling', 'antithetic 
variate' and 'orthonormal' methods. According to Hamersley and Handscomb, 68 the 
common characteristic and usefulness of these techniques is that, as they do not introduce 
bias into the estimation, the results are more precise and the estimation requires less 
labour. 
The 'control variate' method is based on the idea of changing the more complex model 
under consideration to a similar, but simpler, one that has an analytic solution. Thus, on 
the assumption that g(x;) is a function of X;, with the mean value G given by 
G = f g(x)h(x) (3 .7) 
A 
where the integral can be evaluated analytically and h(x) is a probability density function , 
solving equations (3. 4) and (3 . 7) as a system of two equations with x as unknown, then 
68Hammersley, J., and Handscomb, D. Monte Carlo Methods, op.cit. 
51 
x = G + f g(x)[f(x) - h(x)]dx. (3 .8) 
A 
Using the crude Monte Carlo method to evaluate the integral on the right hand side of 
equation (3 . 8), the new revised estimate ( =x*) of x can be obtained, where h is the 
'control variable'. Thus, x* is given by 
x* = G + (x-G), (3 .9) 
which is an unbiased estimate with the variance equal to var( x )+var( G )-cov( x, G ), 
A var(6) 
and as long as cov( x , G )> , the variance of the x* will be less than the variance of 
2 
A 
x , or 
A A 1 var G 
corr(x ,G) > -
2 var(.x) · 
(3 .10) 
Equation (3 .10) states that the efficiency gain is a function of the relationship between f 
and h. 
3.3.1. Application of the Monte Carlo Simulation 
The results of the crude Monte Carlo simulation of the average market values of housing 
is presented in Table 3-2 below where the last column presents 95% confidence interval 









The Estimated Average Market Value of Housing Using 
the Crude Monte Carlo Simulation 
Assumed range of the Mid point Crude Monte Sample standard 95% 
values of the Carlo estimate deviation confidence interval 
residential units (300 trials) 
23 ,500 - 40,000 31 ,750 32,121 8,023 31,213 $ ~ $ 32,028 
37,000 - 53,500 45,250 45,273 7,977 44,370 $ ~ $ 46,175 
49,000 - 65,500 57,250 57,224 7,898 56,330 $ ~ $ 58,117 
60,500 - 80,000 70,250 68,664 7,856 67,775 $ ~ $ 69,552 
77,000 - 93 ,500 85,250 85,473 7,809 84,589 $ ~ $ 86,356 
93 ,500 - 110,000 101,750 101,606 7,423 100,766 $ ~ $ 102,445 
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CHAPTER4 
THE REAL COST OF 
THE MORTGAGE INDEMNITY 
SCHEME 
4.1. The Calculation of the Cost 
The cost of the proposed Mortgage Indemnity Scheme (MIS) was calculated for each year 
of the proposed MIS and for each of the different categories of loans as approximated by 
the midpoint of the range of the loan values (=B). Table 4-1 , below, presents the average, 
and total, value of the loans, while Table 4-2 presents the average, and total, market value 
of housing used in the calculation of the total cost of the MIS. 
TABLE 4-1 
Average and Total Value of Loans Granted 
No The midpoint value Probability of Number of loans Total value ofloans granted 
of the loan range occurrence n (Rand) 
(Rand) Po T=3 T=2 T=l T=3 T=2 T=l 
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (Sa) (Sb) (Sc) 
1 17,500 0.54 27,000 81,000 135,000 472,500,000 1,41 7,500,000 2,362,500,000 
2 32,500 0.15 7,500 22,500 37,500 243, 750,000 731,250,000 1,218, 750,000 
3 47,500 0.09 4,500 13,500 22,500 213,750,000 641 ,250,000 1,068,750,000 
4 62,500 0.08 4,000 12,000 20,000 250,000,000 750,000,000 1,250,000,000 
5 77,500 0.08 4,000 12,000 20,000 310,000,000 930,000,000 1,550,000,000 
6 92,500 0.06 3,000 9,000 15,000 277,500,000 832,500,000 1,387,500,000 
Total : 1.00 50,000 150,000 250,000 1, 767,500,000 5,302,500,000 8,837,500,000 
TABLE 4-2 
Average and Total Market Value of Housing 
No The average Probability of Number of units Total market value of housing 
value of a single occurrence n (Rand) 
unit 69 
(Rand) Po T=3 T=2 T=l T=3 T=2 T=l 
( 1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (Sa) (Sb) (Sc) 
1 32,121 0.54 27,000 81 ,000 135,000 867,267,000 2,515,074,300 4, 700,587, l 40 
2 45,273 0.15 7,500 22,500 37,500 339,547,500 984,687, 750 1,840,347,450 
3 57,224 0.09 4,500 13,500 22,500 257,508,000 746, 773,200 1,395,693,360 
4 68,664 0.08 4,000 12,000 20,000 274,656,000 796,502, 400 1,488,635,520 
5 85,473 0.08 4,000 12,000 20,000 341 ,892,000 991 ,486,800 1,853,054,640 
6 101 ,606 0.06 3,000 9,000 15,000 304,818,000 883,972,200 1,652,113,560 
Total: 1 50,000 150,000 250,000 2,385,688,500 6,918,496,650 12,930,431 ,670 
690btained by a Monte Carlo simulation, Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3. 
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As can be seen from the tables above, the total number of the loans in the first year, T =3, 
is assumed to be 50,000. It has been also assumed that in the second year an additional 
100,000 loans will be granted, thus the total number of the loans at the end of the year 
two, T =2, is equal to 150,000; and, that in the third year another 100,000 loans will be 
granted, so that the total number of the loans at the end of the year three, T = 1, will be 
250,000 loans. 
The distribution of loans amongst the different categories of loans is given by the 
probability of occurrence (=P0) in column 3 in the tables above. The probability of 
occurrence is invariant with respect to Time. Thus, the number of loans ( =n) for each of 
the category of the loans within a particular year is a product of the value of PO for the 
particular midpoint value of the loans, and the total number of the loans for that year, and 
is given in columns 4a, 4b and 4c in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. 
The total value of loans granted during the first, second and third years of the MIS is given 
in the last three columns of Table 4-1, i.e. columns Sa, Sb and Sc, respectively. It is the 
product of the midpoint of the loans and of related quantity of loans. 
The total market value of housing is given in columns Sa, Sb and Sc of Table 4-2. While 
the total value of housing in the first year is a product of the number of residential units 
and the average market value of a single unit (=V ), provision has been made for 
depreciation of the residential units at 10% per year in order to calculate the total market 
value of housing during the second and the third years of the MIS. In addition, the cost of 
the MIS has also been calculated for a wide range of possible percentage changes in the 
market price of residential units as given by the standard deviation (=cr) of those 
percentage changes, which ranges involve from 0.05 to 0.50 percentage points. 
4.2. The Real Value of the MIS 
The complete results of the evaluation of the possible values of the Mortgage Indemnity 
Scheme using the housing model presented in Chapter 3 are given in Table 4-3, Table 4-4 
and Table 4-5 below, for the each year of the MIS. The value of the MIS has been 
calculated on the assumption of a default rate ( =dr) equal to 100% so as to illustrate the 
maximum value of the MIS which can occur; any other default rate will, of course, yield 
lower values of the MIS. 
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TABLE 4-3 
The Cost of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme at Three years to Maturity 
a 13 = R17,500 13 = R32,500 13 = R47,500 13 = R62,500 13 = R77,500 13 = R92,500 
A B A B A B A B A B A B c 
0.05 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0.04 
0.10 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0.04 
0.15 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 242,891 0.002 281,680 0.001 270,362 0.002 0.04 
0.20 0 0.000 0 0.000 455,672 0.003 1,500,578 0.010 1,802,492 0.009 1,667,875 0.010 0.04 
0.25 0 0.000 162,141 0.001 1,927,997 0.014 3,991 ,166 0.025 4,850,308 0.025 4,433,974 O.Q25 0.04 
0.30 0 0.000 1,854,180 0.012 4,345,302 0.032 oMB &&h 0.04 
0.35 0 0.000 JpgJ: 11 ,696,441 0.074 14,345,798 0.074 12,989,074 0.074 0.04 
0.40 1,056,750 0.083 16,401 ,911 0.104 20,162,521 0.103 18,212,832 0.104 0.04 
0.45 6,576,029 0.022 12,239,242 0.080 15,287,342 0.114 21 ,435,597 0.136 26,392,181 0.135 23,800,682 0.136 0.04 
0.50 dK~~]Js 664i; 16,836,895 0.110 19,628,007 0.146 26,678,626 0.170 32,886,110 0.169 29,620,726 0.170 0.04 
TABLE 4-4 
The Cost of The Mortgage Indemnity Scheme at Two years to Maturity 
a 13 = R17,500 13 = R32,500 13 = R47,500 B = R62,500 B = R77,500 13 = R92,500 
A B A B A B A B A B A B c 
0.05 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0.027 
0.10 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 77,019 0.000 76,261 0.000 86,246 0.000 0.027 
0.15 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 2,112,869 0.004 2,472,616 0.004 2,350,972 0.004 0.027 
0.20 0 0.000 0 0.000 2,466,224 0.005 8,084,037 0.015 9,707,515 0.014 8,985,438 O.oJ5 0.027 
0.25 0 0.000 128,526 ij:pji #Di~( 0.027 
0.30 0 0.000 5,581,333 0.053 35,462,518 0.052 32,275,920 0.053 0.027 
0.35 0 42,215,293 0.077 51,700,781 0.076 46,883,658 0.077 0.027 
0.40 37,069,039 0.079 56,360,709 0.102 69,188,161 0.101 62,587,076 0.102 0.027 
0.45 8,044,333 0.008 36,188,537 0.067 49,036,972 0.104 71 ,143,205 0.129 87,483,717 0.128 78,996,959 0.129 0.027 
0.50 26,618,174 0.026 49,320,617 0.092 61,586,563 0.131 86,323,589 0.157 I 06,286,399 0.156 95,847,978 0.157 0.027 
TABLE 4-5 
The Cost of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme at One year to Maturity 
a 13 = R17,500 13 = R32,500 13 = R47,500 13 = R62,500 13 = R77,500 13 = R92,500 
A B A B A B A B A B A B c 
0.05 0 0.000 0 0.000 10,147 0.000 316,748 0.000 30,141 0.000 34,m 0.000 0.014 
0.10 0 0.000 0 0.000 5,387,306 0.004 19,672,551 0.013 4,906,120 0.003 4,788,603 0.003 0.014 
0.15 0 0.000 J~JJi&~m Q:03'7 21,142,324 0.013 19,858,567 0.014 0.014 
0.20 0 0.000 0 91 ,991 ,847 0.061 ){1.~i~}i.i] &Mt @ip@ 0.014 
0.25 0 0.000 103,235 74,173,489 0.058 126,945,016 0.085 71,650,184 0.045 65,693,333 0.046 0.014 
0.30 0 0.000 I 00,553,308 0.078 160,504,328 0.107 I 00,813,828 0.063 91,957,910 0.064 0.014 
0.35 0 0.000 127,014,095 0.099 193,014,128 0.129 131,156,429 0.082 119,221,669 0.084 0.014 
0.40 0 0.000 44,246,693 0.035 153,414,575 0.120 224, 730,525 0.150 162,197,571 0.102 147,073,013 0.103 0.014 
0.45 0 0.000 64,483,825 0.051 179,693,533 0.140 255,822,516 0.171 193,648,000 0.122 175,264,499 0.123 0.014 
0.50 ······} ~;1ls,J7' 0.001 86,281,092 0.069 205,818,869 0.160 286,399,022 0.191 225,320,914 0.141 203,636,317 0.143 0.014 
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In the tables above, A (=G(l)), is the real value of the Mortgage Indemnity Scheme in 
Rands; B ( = :~:~ J, is the value of the loan guarantee as the fraction of the value of the 
loan covered by the guarantee, and C( = l-e-(RC7}r)7), is the value above the risk-free 
interest rate which banks will charge to cover the additional risk involved in lending funds 
to a home-loan customer. 
In addition to the estimates presented in the tables above, different values of the MIS can 
be very easily calculated for any other default rate or any other distribution of the total 
quantity of the loans amongst a various categories of the loans. Thus, for example, to 
calculate the cost of the MIS at two years to maturity for that category of loans with a 
midpoint value of R32,500, on assumption that this category of the loans accounts for 
65% of the total quantity of the loans distributed, i.e. P 1=0.65; and with value of the 
standard deviation of the percentage changes in the market values of residential units equal 
to 0.35, we need merely to refer to Table 4-4 (.B=R32,500, column A) to read the value 
of G(l) and then multiply that value by ~ ~' where P1 is the new probability of 
Pa 
occurrence, P0 is the probability of occurrence given in Table 4-1 ( or Table 4-2, 
column 3), and ~ is the new default rate. This, of course, yields the following values: 
G1=R13,826,018; P 1=0.65; P0=0.15; and dr=0 .6. Thus G2 =13,826,018 °· 65 0.6 or 0.15 
G2=R35,947,647 which is value of the MIS under these particular assumed values. 
As can be seen from the above results, the 'real' value of the proposed Mortgage 
Indemnity Scheme depends crucially on the value of cr, the value of the loans, and the time 
to maturity. Moreover, it can be seen that there is a positive relationship between the value 
of the Government guarantee and the value of the standard deviation. Specifically, as cr 
becomes larger, the value of the Government guarantee also becomes larger. However, it 
is interesting to note that the value of G(l), the Government guarantee, increases much 
faster than does the value of cr. Thus, for instance, if .B=R62,500, (in Table 4-3), the value 
of cr has been increased almost four-fold, from 0.15 to 0.50, while the value of G(l) has 
increased fully 110 times, from R242,891 to R26,678,626 and the value of the loan 
guarantee as a fraction of the value of the loan covered by the guarantee rises from 0,002 
to fully 0.170 percentage points. Similarly, as the value of loans, and their time to 
maturity, changes, we can see that if the value of the loan were equal to Rl 7,500, 
(Table 4-3, T =3 years), the guarantee takes on a value greater than zero only at cr~0.4, 
while if the value of the loans were equal to or greater than R 4 7, 5 00 the guarantee has a 
positive value of cr~0.15. With a time to maturity of one year, (Table 4-5), for loans of 
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RI 7,500 the values of the guarantee becomes greater than zero at cr~0.5, while for those 
loans of R47,500 or greater, the value of the guarantee becomes greater than zero at a 
value of cr as low as 0,05. This clearly shows the existence of the negative relationship 
between the standard deviation and the time to maturity on the one hand, and the value of 
the guarantee on the other. 
That the value of the guarantee becomes greater than zero at lower values of cr for higher 
value of the loans (regardless of time to maturity) results from the initial ratio between the 






The Value of the Loan as the Fraction of the 
Initial Value of the Residential Unit 
17,500 R32,500 R47,500 R62,500 R77,500 R92,500 
0.54 0.72 0.83 0.90 0.91 0.91 
Source: Calculated from Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 
As mentioned earlier, the initial value of the residential unit is the sum of the value of the 
loan, plus the value of the State subsidy, plus the individual's contribution. Since almost 
half of the initial value of the lower priced residential units is financed via subsidy and the 
individual down-payment, the lower priced residential units require a much greater 
reduction in price than do the higher priced units. In other words, there must be a much 
greater reduction in the market value of the lower priced units than in the market value of 
higher priced units for the outstanding balances to become greater than the value of 
housing--in which case, of course, the value of the guarantee also becomes greater. 
It should be noted that the rate of depreciation of I 0% per year importantly affects the 
value of the loan-value-of-housing ratio regardless of changes in the market value of 
housing. Thus, with a shorter time to maturity, smaller changes in values of cr are needed 
to affect the value of the Government guarantee. 70 
70For periods longer than three years, due to the repayment of the home loans, the value of the loans will 
decrease proportionally and this will not be the case any more. However the initial duration of the MIS is 
only three years, in which period home owner will pay only the interest on the loan while the principal of 
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As the value of the guarantee, G(7), gives an indication of the absolute value of the 
Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, the value of the loan guarantee as a fraction of the value of 
the loan covered by the guarantee, ~;: ; , (which results are given in column B of the 
above tables), gives an indication of the relative value of the guarantee to the financial 
institutions. Thus, when this value is greater than the home loan premium, (= I-e-(R(7)-r)) , as 
can be seen in column C in the above tables, then financial institution should--in principle--
be willing to pay to obtain the Government guarantee as additional insurance to limit 
possible loss. In cases where the insurance premium is less than or equal to the home loan 
premium, financial institutions would not be prepared to pay to obtain the Government 
guarantee as additional insurance since it would merely increase their cost by the amount 
paid for the guarantee while not reducing risk. 
To calculate the total value of the MIS for a chosen distribution of the total quantity of 
home loans amongst a different categories of the loans, we need merely sum the individual 
values of MIS for the different categories of the loans. Table 4-7 illustrate how to 
calculate the total value of the MIS for values of cr and P as given in the table. 
TABLE 4-7 
The Values of the MIS for the Individual 
Categories of Loans 
(for T = 1, n = 250,000) 
iJ p cr G(T) 
17,500 0.54 0.15 0 
32,500 0.15 0.15 0 
47,500 0.09 0.20 48,257,567 
62,500 0.08 0.25 126,945,016 
77,500 0.08 0.30 100,813 ,828 
92,500 0.06 0.30 91 ,957,910 
Source: Calculated from Table 4-5, above 
The six values of G(]) for a given cr was obtained from Table 4-5 . Thus, the total value of 
the MIS is equal to fully R367,974,321. To calculate the total value of MIS for any other 
values of cr, the time to maturity (=7), P and d/1 we need merely replace the above values 
the loan will not be affected, it will be the same. 
710.05~cr~0.5, l ~T~3. og~1 and O~dr~ lOO 
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of G(1) with the new ones from the above tables and sum. 
4.3. Summary of the Results 
If the 'low income' housing market is divided yet further into two segments--an upper and 
a lower one, with R47,500 as the lower boundary of the upper segment--then Table 4-8 
clearly shows that the higher risk, and ultimately a higher value of the MIS, is more likely 
at higher segments of the market than at lower ones. 
TABLE 4-8 
The Cut off Values of er for which Insurance Premium 
Becomes Greater than Risk Premium 
B cr G(T) cr G(T) cr G(T) -- -- --
(T = 3) 
Be-rT 
(T = 2) 
Be-rT 
(T = 1) 
Be-rT 
17,500 0.50 0.046 I I I I 
32,500 0.40 0.053 040 0.045 0.35 0.021 
47,500 0.35 0.056 0.30 0.034 0.15 0.019 
62,500 0.30 0.048 0.25 0.032 0.15 0.037 
77,500 0.30 0.047 0.25 0.031 0.20 0.028 
92,500 0.30 0.048 0.25 0.032 0.20 0.029 
Source: Calculated from Table 4-3, Table 4-4, and Table 4-5, above 
Note: The corresponding values of the home loans premium are: 0.004, 0.027 and 0.014 
respectively. 
As mentioned above, according to Rode's Report, 72 price variation of those residential 
units at the upper segment of the market was 23.4%, while the price variability for 
residential units in the lower segment of the market was 11 . 4 % for 1994. Thus, according 
to the complete results presented in Table 4.3, Table 4-4, and Table 4-5, the value of the 
Government loan guarantee scheme--the MIS--could be substantial in the case of high 
price volatility and high default rates, and these amounts will ultimately be paid by the 
South African Government, and thus by South African tax-payers. However, the same 
results clearly show that there is a potentially large benefit for those financial institutions 
covered by the MIS since they can shift, completely, the risk of home loans to the 
Government. 73 
72Cape Times, 17 April 1995, n.p. 
73 According to Business Day, the default rate at the low end of the housing market, (average loan of 
Rl5,000), was 40% for 1993 and 50% for 1994. Thus the SA Housing Trust is running related losses of 
approximately R60 mill. Business Day, (24 April 1995), n.p. 
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Thus, the crucial questions are whether South Africa really needs a Mortgage Indemnity 
Scheme, and if so, whether guarantees need to be given to financial institutions, and to 
home loan borrowers, at zero cost to them? 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that, based on the political uncertainty which surrounds 
the low-cost housing market and the Government's unwillingness, or inability, to fully 
enforce the law, there is a strong political case to be made for some kind of Government 
loan guarantee. In this regard, then, the role of the MIS is positive. Without it, access to 
the loan market would be impossible for a majority of the South African population's, yet 
with it, the time needed to rebuild investors' confidence in this segment of the housing 
market may be shortened. 
This noted, it is, however, difficult to make a case for 'free' insurance for financial 
institutions and home-loan borrowers. As far as financial institutions are concerned, they 
will clearly benefit from the MIS, and especially so in the segment of the home loans 
above R47,50074 where risk is greater. On the other hand, if financial institutions require 
some additional incentives to re-enter the lower segment of the market, then it may be not 
unreasonable for the Government, for a given period of time, to offer loan guarantees 
without cost. In such a case, however, then there should be strict monitoring of all 
mutually agreed procedures regarding lending and strict enforcement of repossession and 
eviction court orders. For example, in the case of residential units which are repossessed 
for any reason, the Government could use those repossessed units as replacements for its 
financial subsidy, and the new home owner could merely take over repayment of the home 
loan, which may--in turn--reduce the overall cost of the MIS . 
As far as the upper segment of the housing market are concerned, there is no need for 
such incentives. The value of the loans is sufficient to act as an incentive to financial 
institutions to re-enter this segment of the market. Combined with the Government 
guarantees and possible substantial benefits from the MIS, there is no necessity that 
Government give loan guarantee to financial institutions and to home loan borrowers 
without cost. Thus, it would be rational for the Government to charge a price for its loan 
guarantee on those loans above certain amount, which--in our model--are for those loans 
equal to or above R47,000. 
Tables 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 show that the difference between the value of the loan guarantee 
74As the lower boundary in our model 
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as a fraction of the value of the loan covered by the guarantee and the home loan premium 
can be substantial value and can range from as low as 0.005 to as high as 0.191 percentage 
points. By way of comparison, for instance, the very similar United States Government 
home loan guarantee scheme charges 0.005% per month on the outstanding amount of 
the loans for its services. However, these services also include the securisation of the 
home loans, which was one of the major instruments to attract non-traditional investors in 
the home loan market. 75 
Thus, if the South African Government successfully proceeds with its apparent plans 
regarding securisation of home loans, then charging for loan guarantees will be yet more 
desirable. Risk-averse investors would have incentive to invest in such secured bonds, 
which will be virtually risk-free and would yield yet a higher return than would similar 
assets available in current markets. 76 
75Dunn, K. , and McConnell, J. "Valuation of GNMA mortgage-backed securities", The Journal of 
Finance, (vol. 36, 1981, pp. 599 - 615) 
76The assumptions of the higher return is based on the proposed fixed 22,5% home loan interest rate for 
the low-cost housing. However this will be the case only if the future inflation could be sustained at 
present or below the present level. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has evaluated the real cost of the proposed South African Government 
sponsored Mortgage Indemnity Scheme. This evaluation has been based on standard 
financial techniques, and, in particular, on Put option pricing theory. Therefore, in the first 
part of the paper, some of the standard models of the evaluation of the loan guarantees 
using the Put option method, i.e. Merton's analytic derivation of the cost of loan 
guarantees, Sosin's model of the valuation of federal loan guarantees to corporations, 
Jones and Masson's model of valuation of loan guarantees and the model of Chen, Chen 
and Sears, have been presented. The general conclusion of the models presented is that the 
value of a Government loan guarantee is positively related to the standard deviation of the 
changes of the market value of the underlying security or securities and to the time-to-
maturity of debt, and that a Government loan guarantee has a positive value to both 
lenders and borrowers. Thus, the Government should charge a fee in exchange for the 
benefits received. 
However, given the specific structure of the proposed Mortgage Indemnity Scheme, 77 the 
above models could not be directly applied in their original forms to evaluate the cost of 
the MIS. Therefore, in order to develop a housing model to estimate this cost, it was 
necessary to make some modification to Merton's model. The empirical results obtained by 
the modified Merton's model--presented in Table 4-3, Table 4-4 and Table 4-5--were 
consistent with the general conclusion mentioned above that (a) there is a positive 
relationship between the value of the MIS, on the one hand, and the value of the standard 
deviation, the time-to-maturity and the value of the loans, on the other, and (b) the 
Government loan guarantees, represented by the MIS, have a value to both lenders and 
borrowers. Thus, as mentioned above, the Government should charge a fee for the 
insurance benefits received by lenders and borrowers. 
As far as the real cost of the MIS is concerned, it was illustrated that the cost of the MIS 
to the South African Government may be as low as zero and to as much as one billion 
Rand when the total value of the loans granted is approximately eight billion Rand78, and 
77The coverage offered by the MIS is limited to only three years, while housing loans are usually granted 
to 15-20 years. 
78For example, the cost of the MIS for the lowest category ofloans (B = Rl7,500) is zero for almost all 
values of a, regardless of time to maturity. In contrast, the cost of MIS of the highest category of loans 
(B = R92,500) has a positive value of at a= 0.10. 
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thus the Government (read: taxpayers) might be constrained to bear these potential cost. 
Moreover, it has also been illustrated that the main beneficiaries of the MIS will be: (a) 
those households at the upper end of the low-cost housing market, and (b) private 
financial institutions which will be indemnified by the terms of MIS . This conclusion is 
obtained when the low-cost housing market is divided into two segments with R47,500 
value of the loan as the border between the lower and the upper segment. Thus, it may be 
illustrated that the overall risk of lending related to the lower end (segment) of the market 
is far lower than the risk related to the upper end (segment) of the market. 79 
Accordingly, the mere fact that the main beneficiaries will be those two categories of end-
users and not these at the lower segment of the low-cost housing market80 suggests that 
the MIS may not attain its principal purpose--that of serving these in the lowest income 
group. Therefore, it does not make sense for the Government to fail to charge a fee for its 
guarantee if the main beneficiaries are not the ones for whom the programme was devised 
in the first place. 
Thus, if the Government wants--for political reasons--to establish some kind of loan 
guarantees, then it must distinguish between these two segments of the low-cost housing 
market, and must provide its loan guarantee without cost to the end users only for the 
lower segment of the market, which in our model are those households which can afford 
home loans less than R47,500. For those loans above R47,500, private financial 
institutions which will lend funds and the households which will borrow funds should be 
charged fees in return for the Government loan guarantee. We can conclude that there is 
no reason why the Government should bear the likely cost of the MIS. In contrast, the 
Government should charge a fee for its guarantee. 
79The empirical results illustrate that the home loan premium charged by financial institutions above the 
risk-free interest rate is sufficiently large for financial institutions to cover additional risk involved with 
the lending of the funds to the lower end of the low-cost housing market. On the other hand, the same 
results illustrate that at the upper end of the low-cost housing market, that difference is not large enough 
to cover additional risk involved with these segment 
80Based on the fact that the households at the upper-end of low-cost housing market could presumably 
afford home loan and that private financial institutions would enter this segment of the market regardless 
of the government loan guarantee. 
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